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In this work, the author analyses the grounds for establishment of the two 
peacekeeping operations deployed in Croatia in the early and mid-1990s, as 
well as implementation of their two most important components and their 
effect. The author ascertains that these were classic peacekeeping operations 
based on documents which were drafted by diplomats Cyrus Vance and 
Marrack Goulding on behalf of the United Nations. Both operations were 
ultimately assessed as unsuccessful, mostly because they reflected the 
international community’s ineffective and uncoordinated policy toward 
Yugoslavia and the states which emerged after its violent disintegration.
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The Vance plan, which we had been sent to implement, would clearly benefit the 
Croatians in the long term; the question was, how long would they wait before 
they took matters into their own hands? A lot would depend on the efficiency 
of the UNPROFOR operation, and the strength of the diplomatic support we 
would receive from the Security Council.
Lewis MacKenzie, Peacekeeper. The Road to Sarajevo, 115.
On December 28, 1992, the afternoon I arrived in Zagreb, I was invited to meet 
the Foreign Minister of Croatia, Mate Granic. This was my first meeting with a 
man who was already a key figure in the negotiations, and with whom I would 
later spend many hours. Balding, immaculately dressed, charming, and polite, he 
greeted me and almost immediately began to explain why, if the United Nations 
did not fulfill its obligations under the Vance plan and restore the Krajina to its 
rightful owners, another war between Serbia and Croatia was inevitable.
Richard Holbrooke, To End a War, 44-45
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Introduction
The violent collapse of the Yugoslav federation, which occurred in the ear-
liest stage of the post-Cold War world’s development, upset the victorious self-
confidence of the democratic West. From the early 1990s to the onset of the 
new millennium, a considerable portion of South-east Europe was the focus 
of massive armed conflicts, a high degree of destruction of property and, most 
importantly, numerous and often brutal killings of civilian populations. Such 
conflicts had not been seen in Europe since the end of the Second World War. 
The ensuing shock was not, however, due to a lack of foreknowledge: the plan 
put forth by the political, scholarly and religious elites of the most numerous 
nation of communist Yugoslavia, the Serbs, for the country’s reorganization 
along expressly centralist lines as the best guarantor of Serbian predominance 
(which from the very start implied the used of armed force as well), was recog-
nized in due time in the decision-making centres of the democratic West.1 By 
the same token, the expected resistance to Belgrade’s intentions, which consti-
tuted a genuine threat to the national individuality of all non-Serbian nations, 
ensured that armed conflict would become a certainty. The Croatian resistance 
to Belgrade’s armed aggression, the first conflict to assume a massive frame-
work, should have served as sufficient warning to prevent the later spread of 
warfare to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.
The international community’s intervention in Yugoslavia was therefore 
influenced by a series of reasons. Fear of the conflict spreading to surrounding 
regions, which could have drawn the involvement of neighbouring states, the 
possible influence of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration on the Union of So-
viet Socialist Republics (USSR), the extent of the humanitarian crisis and the 
potential opportunity to verify the stability of the new geopolitical situation 
at the close of the Cold War – which had as its principal features the global 
dominance of the United States of America, the reunified Germany and efforts 
aimed at the political and economic unification of the continent led by the Eu-
ropean Community (EC) – were some of the more important of these reasons. 
Ultimately, there was virtually no major international organization that did 
not intervene in the process of resolving the Yugoslav crisis and armed con-
flict in the states which emerged after its disintegration. The reasons, methods, 
particularities and results of this intervention have been analysed in numer-
ous scholarly works, as well as popular histories and current affairs texts and 
memoirs.2 The aim of this work is to present the causes for the establishment 
1 See, for example, the numerous reports of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 
period 1987-1991, cited in Josip Glaurdić, Vrijeme Europe. Zapadne sile i raspad Jugoslavije (Za-
greb: MATE d.o.o., 2011).
2 Of the numerous examples, I cite here as the most useful: Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, Diplomacy 
on the Edge. Containment of Ethnic Conflict and the Minorities Working Group of the Conferences 
on Yugoslavia (Washington D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2007), Norbert Both, From Indifference to Entrapment. The Netherlands and the Yugoslav 
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of peacekeeping operations in Croatia under the aegis of the United Nations 
(UN), examine its fundamental characteristics where this pertains to the two 
most vital aspects of implementation, and attempt to ascertain the primary 
reasons for their failure.
The United Nations and the end of the Cold War
Ambitiously conceived as a collective guarantee of global security after the 
tragic experiences of a just concluded World War, the UN was forced to con-
front bitter reality immediately upon the close of said war. The constant stand-
off between the US and the USSR completely paralyzed its most important 
body, the Security Council, rendering it ineffective. The operations of the UN, 
or rather its peacekeeping forces, was reduced to the maintenance of precari-
ous ceasefires, while nothing came of its idealized role as the world’s most im-
portant peacekeeper. Harbingers of the end of the Cold War, i.e., the increas-
ingly apparent weakening of the USSR, indicated the possibility of change. The 
U.S. administration headed by the elder President George Bush assumed an 
increasingly prominent position  within the Security Council, which entailed 
increasingly better cooperation with the UN Secretary General, Peruvian Ja-
vier Pérez de Cuéllar, and the beginning of a solution to the sizeable US debt 
arrears to the UN. The success of the intervention in Iraq and Kuwait in 1990 
and 1991, which had UN approval, although carried out by US forces, was the 
most visible sign of these newly-established good relations.3 The UN therefore 
became an important mechanism of Bush’s ‘New World Order’ of global se-
curity, which was supposed to ensure the promotion of democratic processes 
everywhere in the world where this need arose by means of humanitarian in-
terventions freed of the burden of Realpolitik.4 These changes in the situation 
necessitated changes within the UN’s system. These were laid out in a document 
Crisis 1990-1995 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,  2000), J. Glaurdić, Vrijeme Europe, 
Marrack Goulding, The Peacemonger (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), James 
Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will. International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1997) Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: The Modern 
Library, 1999), Borisav Jović, Poslednji dani SFRJ (Kragujevac: Prizma, 1996), Michael Libal, 
Njemačka politika i jugoslavenska kriza 1991.-1992. (Zagreb: Golden Marketing – Tehnička kn-
jiga, 2008), Mario Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks. Diplomatski procesi iza zatvorenih vrata 1990.-1997. 
(Zagreb: Nakladni zavod Globus, 2000), David Owen, Balkanska odiseja (Zagreb: Hrvatska 
sveučilišna naklada, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 1998), Saadia Touval, Mediation in the Yugo-
slav Wars. The Critical Years 1990-1995 (New York: Palgrave, 2002), Henri Vajnans, U žrvnju. 
Jugoslavenska hronika jul 1991 – avgust 1992 (Beograd: Radio B92, 1996).
3 Stephen F. Burgess, The United Nations under Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1992-1997 (Lanham, 
Maryland and London: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 2001), pp. 2-7.
4 William J. Durch, “Keeping the Peace: Politics and Lessons of the 1990s”, in: William J. 
Durch, ed., UN Peacekeeping, American Politics, and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s (New York: A 
Henry L. Stimson Centre Book, St. Martin’s Press, 1996), p. 2.
I. MIŠKULIN, An Avoidable Failure: Peacekeeping in croatia, 1991-1995
40
drafted in June 1992 by the ambitious new UN Secretary General, Egyptian 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, called An Agenda for Peace. In it, the Secretary Gen-
eral asserted among other things that the UN should be oriented toward more 
dynamic intervention models, above all those aimed at peace enforcement.5 In 
the period after the end of Cold War, the USA exercised a dominant role in the 
decision making in the United Nations, bur after the events in Somalia in 1993 
the realtions between the American administration and Ghali cooled down. 
All that was therefore left was to ascertain the extent to which the entire UN 
system was prepared to respond to the requirements of its intended role as the 
extension of US foreign policy.
UN Involvement in the Conflict in Croatia
The lead in the international community’s peace mediation in the Yugo-
slav crisis was accorded to the European Community. In the shadow of ef-
forts aimed at more intense political and economic integration of EC member 
states, they decided to test their ability to create a common foreign policy and 
coordinated European security problem-solving with obvious enthusiasm. The 
problem which had begun to break out in Europe’s back yard could thus not be 
left to anyone else. In September 1991, when the special Peace Conference on 
the Former Yugoslavia began functioning, the EC had already set down three 
fundamental parameters within which a solution had to be found. First and 
foremost, preservation of Yugoslavia’s integrity was no longer the most impor-
tant objective of the international community. This stance was confirmed by 
the Brijuni Declaration of July 1991, which accorded de facto recognition to 
Slovenia’s independence. By stressing that changes in republic borders made 
by force would not be recognized, these borders became de facto international 
borders. Evenutally, the internal republic borders of the disappearing Yugoslav 
federation would became more acceptable to the international community, i.e., 
they could be recognized insofar as they met the high criterion of protection of 
ethnic minorities in all of their territories. Insistence on a solution to the con-
flict that would have gone beyond the boundaries of these parameters simply 
could not become the international community’s official policy. These parame-
ters were rooted in the acknowledgement of Serbia’s aggressive war against the 
remaining republics of Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, some of the bigger member 
state did not abandon special politics, often based on the denial of reality and 
misrepresentation of history, that objectively were attempts to alter this fixed 
conflict-resolution framework. One of the most important reasons for this was 
the widespread stance – especially favored by the Great Bitain - whereby a 
solution had to come through a policy of satisfying Serbian interests, which 
included tendencies such as the aspiration to establish a regionally hegemonic 
5 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Unvanquished. A U.S.-U.N. Saga (London-New York: I. B. Tauris 
Publishers, 1999), pp. 27-28.
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role for Serbia and opposition to recognition of Slovenian and Croatian inde-
pendence.6 The consequences of this lack of unity were devastating. The over-
riding features of EC intervention were the frequent imposition of the interests 
of individual member states ahead of their common interests as a result of 
the inability to formulate a common policy, a notable lack of will for other 
forms of intervention except those with a political, economic or humanitarian 
character, and an evident inability to keep pace with unfolding events. This 
obviously benefited the stronger side in the conflict in Croatia. Belgrade had, it 
was noted, recognized at an early phase “the deeply paralyzing differences and 
rivalries within the EC, America’s lack of interest and the weakness of interna-
tional mechanisms” and it correctly gained the conviction “that the world will 
recognize the factual state of affairs and extol the victors”.7 In other words, the 
conflict in Croatia was not halted, rather in the early autumn of 1991 it was 
additionally inflamed, while the EC’s activities served as an illustration of the 
disunity and disarray of the entire international community.
The threat to international security which the conflict in Yugoslavia 
represented, as well as the potential outbreak of a humanitarian crisis of 
major proportions compelled the United Nations to take a stance. Thus, UN 
Security Council Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991 was a reflection of the 
UN’s prevailing stance on the necessity of taking steps to halt the conflict, 
additionally prompted by the interventions of many states such as  Austria, 
Australia and Canada. The central points of emphasis in the Resolution were 
the introduction of a general and complete embargo on the deliveries of 
arms to all sides in the conflict and the refusal to recognize violent changes 
in republic borders.8 The resolution reflected the EC’s position, which in fact 
served as its outline. It is important to note that the UN Security Council 
particularly stressed its support of all EC mediation efforts and endorsed all 
agreements which emerged or could emerge as a result of such mediation. This 
therefore meant that the UN had actually consented to the above-described 
parameters meant to find a solution to the conflict. Resolution 713 thus 
established a delicate balance between the EC and UN vis-à-vis the Yugoslav 
crisis.9 The position of the lead international mediator was retained by the EC, 
while the UN, wielding the authority of the world’s most important peace-
making organization, upheld the EC’s mediation efforts, which were believed 
to have considerably reinforced the latter. Nonetheless, the very fact that the 
Security Council adopted a special document on the situation in Yugoslavia, in 
6 G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy, pp. 8-9, 86-99.
7 M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 111.
8 Anđelko Milardović, ed., Ujedinjeni narodi. Rezolucije o Republici Hrvatskoj. UNPROFOR, 
(Osijek: PANLIBER, 1995), Resolution 713 of 25 September 1991, pp. 19-21.
9 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace. A Secretary-General’s Memoir (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1997), p. 477.
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the binding form of a resolution, meant that mediation of the crisis had in fact 
begun to move to the UN as well to a considerable degree.
Resolution 713 was quickly accompanied by the decision to appoint vet-
eran US diplomat Cyrus R. Vance the UN Secretary General’s special envoy 
for Yugoslavia. Vance’s appointment was the result of successful lobbying by 
British and French diplomats, particularly Lord Peter Carrington, who was 
presiding over the Peace Conference on the Former Yugoslavia. He and Vance 
were tied by many years of friendship.10 There should be no doubt that Vance’s 
appointment was aligned with the positions of US diplomacy, even though 
there were attempts to deny this.11 In any case, Vance enjoyed a high diplo-
matic reputation in the world as a US diplomatic representative even prior to 
his appointment as the UN Secretary General’s envoy. So all Yugoslav partici-
pants rightly saw Vance as the extended arm of the US administration. Vance 
had gained enviable experience in peace mediation during his service as US 
Secretary of State under President Jimmy Carter. In some circles, Vance was 
deemed an honest, if uninformed, broker.12 However, this was less important; 
the key aspect for any international mediator was his ability to secure a com-
promise between the warring sides. For example, de Cuéllar deemed him par-
ticularly skilled and tactful in mediation, which required working within the 
previously-defined framework of a given proposal.13 
The adoption of Resolution 713 in September 1991, and particularly its 
provision on the general arms embargo, signified that the UN Security Coun-
cil had in fact accepted the position which visibly benefited the stronger par-
ty to the conflict, i.e., Belgrade. Namely, the key EC member states, France 
and Great Britain, which politically dominated the EC, were also permanent 
members of the UN Security Council. Instead of facilitating better and more 
substantial communication between the two organizations involved in solving 
the Yugoslav crisis, precisely the opposite happened; exclusively advocating 
their own national interests, France and Great Britain effectively curtailed co-
operation between the UN and the EC.14 Thus, the key member states of the 
EC, an organization which suffered an obvious failure in attempting to halt 
the conflict in Croatia, were now poised to do the same thing within the UN 
Security Council. It is therefore no surprise that the Yugoslav collective presi-
dency, which at that point consisted exclusively of Serbian and pro-Serbian 
representatives from Serbia, Vojvodina, Montenegro and Kosovo, released a 
special communiqué on 2 October 1991 in which it unambiguously endorsed 
10 Ibid., pp. 480-481.
11 For example, R. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 30.
12 M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 244.
13 J. Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, p. 486.
14 Spyros Economides, Paul Taylor, “Former Yugoslavia”, United Nations Interventionism 
1991-2004, Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides, eds. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2008), p. 83.
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Resolution 713 in its entirety.15 The uncoordinated policy of the EC, caused by 
the partisan political interests of its most important member states, thus – with 
no apparent desire for change – became an integral component of the UN’s of-
ficial policy on the Yugoslav crisis.
It was therefore not just a matter of the successful Serbian ploy to play 
the card of discord within the international community. For during October 
1991, the EC nonetheless managed to iron out the details of a complex peace 
plan which was presented for consideration to the conflicting sides in Yugo-
slavia. The plan foresaw the possibility of independence for those republics 
expressing a desire for this, while not excluding the potential creation of a later 
alliance of sovereign republics. Nonetheless, internationally-recognized sov-
ereignty could only be achieved by meeting additional criteria set by the EC, 
above all the institution of comprehensive mechanisms to safeguard ethnic mi-
nority rights, which in the case of Croatia meant securing special political and 
territorial status for the Serbian minority. All of this was rejected by Serbian 
President Slobodan Milošević on several occasions, and not even threats of po-
litical isolation, economic sanctions – which were indeed imposed later – nor 
exclusion from the work of the peace conference in The Hague could compel 
him to assent.16 The reasons for his opposition lay in the assessment that a 
political solution would not guarantee a sufficient degree of protection for the 
Serbs in Croatia. He nevertheless did not entirely refuse, rather he assessed 
them as insufficiently refined, i.e., he sought “firm assurances from the inter-
national community through a suitable international treaty, and a permanent 
international body that would conduct monitoring of enforcement of such a 
treaty”.17 Milošević actually demonstrated willingness to negotiate, meaning 
his rejection of the solutions on offer was not final. As to the aforementioned 
permanent international body, he obviously envisioned some type of neutral 
external military protection that would effectively safeguard Serbian conquests 
in Croatia. Three days prior to a new rejection of the EC’s peace proposal, on 
2 November 1991, he and Borisav Jović, the Serbian member of the collec-
tive federal presidency, aligned their stance that a majority of Croatian territo-
ries “in which a majority Serbian population lived [should be] under Serbian 
authority” and that, therefore, it would be best to seek from the UN “that it 
protect them with its peace forces”.18 Only three days later, on 9 November 
15  “Sprečiti opšti rat”, Borba (Belgrade), 3 October 1991.
16  Slobodanka Kovačević, Putnik Dajić, eds., Hronologija jugoslovenske krize 1942 – 1993 (Bel-
grade: Institut za evropske studije, 1994), p. 45.
17  Sonja Biserko, Saška Stanojlović, eds., Poslednja šansa Jugoslavije: haška konferencija 1991 
(Belgrade: Helsinški odbor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2002), Report from the meeting of the 
Conference on Yugoslavia at the highest level in The Hague held on 18 October 1991, p. 102.
18  B. Jović, Poslednji dani, notation for 2 November 1991, p. 407.
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1991, the federal presidency sent a formal letter to the UN Security Council, in 
which it sought the urgent deployment of peace forces in Croatia.19
At the same time he rejected the peace plan put forward by Carrington’s 
peace conference, Milošević simultaneously denied this identical right to all 
of its other members. This also pertained to the EC, which in the eyes of the 
Serbian side, lost the status of an impartial international broker. As part of the 
peace plan, the EC sought the same degree of protection of minority privileges 
be allowed for the Kosovo Albanians, while it saw the solution to the Serbian 
question in Croatia, regardless of the degree of their protection, within the 
internationally recognized borders of the Republic of Croatia. Additionally, at 
several points the EC explicitly stated that the Serbian side is considered the 
primary driver of the Yugoslav crisis. The EC was therefore not acceptable to 
Belgrade as an unbiased mediator nor as an impartial guarantor of the sought-
after political/territorial privileges of the rebel Serbs in Croatia. On the other 
hand, the EC did not even have any means to impose its proposal. Thus, in 
early November 1991 the EC’s peace mediation reached an impasse.20 It was 
just at this point that Belgrade, in the words of Dutch diplomat and EC special 
envoy Henri Wynaendts, proposed UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia, i.e., it 
unholstered its “lethal weapon”.21
The contention that the EC’s peace mediation exceeded the boundaries of 
impartiality was not exclusive to Belgrade. There was a similar line of thinking 
in a part of UN’s administrative structures. For example, Vance himself, after 
his first visits to Yugoslavia, advised the UN Secretary General to oppose the 
tendency of the increasingly direct specification of Serbia as the exclusive 
culprit for the failure of peace talks.22 This stance was also taken by Briton 
Marrack Goulding, the Under-secretary General in charge of peacekeeping 
operations.23 The EC’s neutrality vis-à-vis Serbia was for that reason, according 
to the UN’s interpretation, responsible for the failure of the peace talks. 
The threat and then introduction of economic sanctions against Serbia in 
early November 1991 was deemed just another example of the EC’s bias. In 
Belgrade, Vance said the institution of sanctions would only additionally fan 
the flames of warfare and impede the progress of the peace process.24 there are 
reasons for believing that Vance’s activities were coordinated with the work 
of the chief of the peace conference in The Hague, Lord Carrington, who also 
publicly expressed his disagreement with instituting sanctions against Serbia. 
German diplomats believed they were thereby intentionally sabotaging the 
19 Hronologija, 46.
20 Poslednja šansa, Report from the fourth plenary session at the highest level of the Confer-
ence on Yugoslavia in The Hague held on 5 November 1991, p. 136.
21 Henri Vejnans, U žrvnju, p. 99.
22 J. Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, p. 484.
23 M. Goulding, The Peacemonger (London, 2003), p. 294.
24 “Sankcije ne mogu rešiti krizu”, Borba, 7 November 1991.
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EC’s efforts.25 De Cuéllar expressed the UN’s prevailing position when he 
announced his grave disappointment “that Europe has thus far failed to find 
a solution to the Yugoslav crisis”.26 This stance was driven by the belief that 
distinguishing Serbia as the primarily culpable party would lead to its political 
isolation, and thus diminish the chance of reaching a peaceful solution. The 
UN increasingly saw itself in the position of an international patron of the 
rebel Croatian Serbs so desired by Serbia’s leader.
US diplomat Richard Holbrooke correctly observed that the most impor-
tant reason for the successful outcome of Vance’s mediation in halting the con-
flict in Croatia during November and December 1991 could be found in the 
fact that he was acting on behalf of an international organization which has 
armed force at its disposal.27 UN peacekeeping forces were, as already noted, 
an acceptable solution for Milošević, because they were deployed as an im-
partial international mediator. Since their deployment signified, besides a halt 
to hostilities, the demilitarization of the zones of their deployment, the with-
drawal of the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA) was necessary, which was entirely 
acceptable to Croatia. For the Serbian leadership accurately assessed that at the 
moment of Croatia’s inevitable recognition, the JNA would be proclaimed an 
occupation force.28 For his part, Croatian President Franjo Tuđman observed 
that the UN peacekeeping forces could “play a positive role in achieving peace 
in this area, if the JNA withdraws from Croatia’s entire territory”.29 The first 
indication of Vance’s success in satisfying the interests of all sides occurred in 
Geneva in late November 1991, when a cease of hostilities was negotiated. The 
agreement was signed in the UN’s regional headquarters, with Vance himself 
presiding over the meeting. It is then not surprising that de Cuéllar noted with 
unconcealed pleasure that it was exclusively the UN’s reputation which served 
as the key factor to the successful outcome of the meeting.30 The armistice 
ironed out in Geneva was, however, not observed. The close of high-intensity 
conflict in Croatia became effective at the very beginning of January 1992 with 
the signing of an agreement in Sarajevo that ended hostilities.31 The reason 
should be sought in the behaviour of the JNA which, as opposed to its previ-
ous stance and in compliance with Belgrade’s view, saw the conclusion of the 
25 M. Libal, Njemačka politika, p. 98.
26 “Razočaranje zbog neuspeha Evrope”, Borba, 8 November 1991.
27 R. Holbrooke, To End a War, p. 31.
28 B. Jović, Poslednji dani, Notation of 5 December 1991, p. 420.
29 S. Vranić, “Mir – novogodišnja čestitka”, Borba, 15 November 1991.
30 J. Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage, p. 489.
31 A. Milardović, ed., Dokumenti o državnosti Republike Hrvatske (od prvih višestranačkih iz-
bora 1990. do međunarodnog priznanja 15. siječnja 1992.) (Zagreb: Alineja, 1992), Document 
no. 6, Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities of 2 January 1992, pp. 165-166.
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conflict in Croatia as a strategic decision.32 Among the peace mediators, the 
signing of this ceasefire was only attended by Vance, which visibly altered the 
focus of the international community’s mediation. The Sarajevo ceasefire of 
1992 enshrined the positions of the parties to the conflict at that moment: the 
agreement of the Serbian leadership with the extent of territories occupied in 
Croatia, the withdrawal of the JNA to Bosnia-Herzegovina as a reflection of 
the expansion of Belgrade’s conquest aims and the desire of the Croatian lead-
ership for a halt to warfare. The UN succeeded where the EC could not.
The vance Plan
Already in mid-October 1991, Carrington stated for the Belgrade media 
that there was “‘a general desire’ by the key Yugoslav actors that United Nations 
peacekeeping troops be deployed in the war-torn districts [of the Republic of 
Croatia]”.33 The document which specified the locations of their deployment 
and the methods for their operation with reference to the conflicting sides was 
presented precisely at the Geneva meeting held in late November 1991. Ac-
cording to Goulding, the plan was the subject of heated debate, but it was gen-
erally accepted and its further refinement was arranged.34 It was made public 
in the first half of December 1991 as a special annex to the UN Secretary Gen-
eral’s report, under the official title Plan for United Nations Peacekeeping Op-
erations in Yugoslavia.35 This plan, which would quickly become better known 
as the Vance Plan, although in fact drafted by Goulding, was actually an in-
terim measure or transitional arrangement, with the basic objective of stabiliz-
ing the situation in the zones of deployment of UN peacekeeping forces, called 
the UN protected areas, for the purpose of unimpeded progress of diplomatic 
negotiations which should have led to a lasting solution to the conflict. The 
plan, therefore, called for the deployment of UN peacekeepers of various types 
in the areas engulfed by the conflict with the task of demilitarizing them and 
ensuring the safety of the civilian populations, thus creating the conditions for 
the return of all displaced persons and refugees. The plan stipulated the es-
tablishment of three UN Protected Areas: Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia 
and Krajina.36 In Boutros-Ghali’s report to the Security Council of 20 Febru-
32 Davor Marijan, Slom Titove armije. JNA i raspad Jugoslavije 1987.-1992. (Zagreb: Golden 
Marketing – Tehnička knjiga, Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2008), p. 333.
33 “Svi za mirovne trupe”, Borba, 15 October 1991.
34 M. Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 300.
35 www.un.org./documents/UN Documentation Centre (UNDOC), S/23280, Report of the Sec-
retary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991), Annex III, 11 December 
1991, pp. 15-21.
36 Dokumenti, Document no. 4, Plan for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations in Yugoslavia 
(November-December 1991), 160. For more on the Vance Plan, see Nikica Barić, Srpska pobuna 
u Hrvatskoj 1990-1995. (Zagreb: Golden Marketing – Tehnička knjiga, 2005), pp.147-150; 
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ary 1992, this was amended, so the aforementioned areas were divided into 
four protected sectors, which were given names to correspond to the compass 
points, as sectors East, West, North and South, or United Nations Protected 
Areas (UNPAs) East, West, North and South.37
The Vance Plan was not intended to serve as a long-term solution to the 
conflict. It was in fact the international community’s most important means to 
arrive at a peace treaty. The latter point was the source of its most vital feature, 
and this was the enforcement of the status quo in the designated UN Protected 
Areas. In other words, the Vance Plan preserved the status in those areas of 
the Republic of Croatia that were under the control of the rebel Serbs, which 
included the continued functioning of their military, police and administrative 
institutions. So instead of the UN assisting the Croatian authorities in establishing 
control over its borders and establishing Croatia’s constitutional order in the 
occupied territories, Zagreb had to consent to the continued functioning of the 
rebel authorities. This was the source of a smouldering conflict between the 
Croatian leadership and UN representatives, Goulding most of all, during all 
of December 1991 and January 1992.38 Even so, the victor in this confrontation 
was known from the very beginning. For already in early November 1991, the 
EC specified that Croatia’s independence could be recognized only in case of a 
comprehensive solution which encompassed guarantees for the full protection 
of ethnic minorities.39 In this sense, a special constitutional law governing 
the rights of ethnic minorities, enacted by the Croatian Parliament in early 
December 1991, obviously was not the type of guarantee that could satisfy 
Milošević. Tuđman was confronted with this fact in early February 1992, when 
German diplomats warned him that his acceptance of the Vance Plan was in 
fact the key factor in Croatia’s international recognition.40 Only several days 
later, on 6 February 1992, Tuđman sent Vance a letter in which he told him 
that he fully and unconditionally accepted the UN’s peacekeeping concept.41 
An unanticipated problem for Belgrade, which saw the deployment of UN 
peacekeeping forces as a strategic aim since late October 1991, emerged when 
the leader of the rebel Serbs, Milan Babić, opposed the plan. Demanding that 
Vladimir Filipović, “Kontroverze Vanceova plana”, Polemos, 9 (2008), no. 1 (21): 91-115, and M. 
Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, pp. 247-249.
37 Momir Stojković, ed., Balkanski ugovorni odnosi 1876 – 1996. (Belgrade: JP Službeni list SRJ, 
SJU RTJ Međunarodna politika, 1999), Document no. 530, Report of UN Secretary General 
Boutros-Ghali on deployment of “blue helmets” to Yugoslavia, dated 20 February 1992, Annex 
I, III: p. 559.
38  For more on this, see M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, pp. 238-244, 249-254.
39  Slavoljub Šušić, Zlatoje Terzić, Nikola Petrović, eds., Zbornik dokumenata iz oblasti odbrane 
i bezbednosti Jugoslavije 1990-1991 godine, (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavački zavod, 2002), Exhibit no. 
128, Declaration on Yugoslavia of 8 November 1991, pp. 550-551.
40  M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 251.
41 Balkanski ugovorni odnosi, Document no. 530, Report of UN Secretary General Boutros-Gha-
li on deployment of “blue helmets” to Yugoslavia, dated 20 February 1992, Annex I, III: p. 561.
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the self-proclaimed Serbian Autonomous District of Krajina, which changed 
its name to the Republic of Serbian Krajina in December 1991, had to be 
entitled to express its consent for the arrival of peacekeeping troops, he was 
actually attempting to secure the backdoor confirmation of the statehood of 
this ‘republic’.42 The Serbian political and military leadership managed to break 
down Babić’s opposition in mid-February 1992, which was the fruit of a long 
lasting campaign to convince the rebel Serbs of the benefits they would derive 
from the Vance Plan.43 Immediately thereafter, Boutros-Ghali notified the UN 
Security Council that it could begin decision-making on the organization of 
peacekeeping forces.44 
Determination of the Type of United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operations in Croatia
The most widespread form of UN peace-making intervention during the 
Cold War consisted of the traditional peacekeeping operation. Based on the 
consent of all sides to a conflict, the neutrality of the peacekeepers and their 
use of force only for the purpose of self-defence reduced their role to separat-
ing conflicting sides. Since UN peacekeeping forces were conceived as a means 
for prevention, their mission did not surpass the framework of maintenance 
of the status quo in the areas of their deployment, i.e., it did not imply the 
resolution of a given conflict.45 The UN peace operations established in Croatia 
in February 1992 and March 1995 bore almost all the features of traditional 
peacekeeping. The consent of the conflicting sides was achieved, as noted, by 
acceptance of the Vance Plan in February 1992. A traditional peacekeeping 
operation implies establishment of a classic buffer zone as the key operative 
means for separating the territories under control of the conflicting sides.46 
The UN peacekeeping troops in Croatia were deployed to the four UNPAs and 
on the Prevlaka Peninsula. The locations of their deployment were subject to 
42 Mate Rupić, ed., Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat 1990.-1995. Dokumenti (Zagreb-
Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski memorijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, Hrvatski in-
stitut za povijest – Podružnica za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2007), Document no. 120, 
Minutes to the 14th meeting of the Krajina Autonomous District Government of 18 November 
1991, II: pp. 272-275.
43 For more on this, see N. Barić, Srpska pobuna, pp. 150-162.
44 Balkanski ugovorni odnosi, Document no. 530, Report of UN Secretary General Boutros-
Ghali on deployment of “blue helmets” to Yugoslavia, dated 20 February 1992, Annex I, III: p. 
561.
45 For more on traditional peacekeeping operations, see Bojan Milisavljević, Nove mirovne 
misije organizacije Ujedinjenih nacija (Belgrade: Pravni fakultet u Beogradu, Službeni glasnik, 
2007), pp. 35-51.
46  Wolgang Biermann, Martin Vadset, “Setting the Scene. The Challenge to the United Nations: 
Peacekeeping in a Civil War”, UN Peacekeeping in Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former 
Yugoslavia, W. Biermann, M. Vadset, ed. (Ashgate: Aldershot, 1999), pp. 17-18.
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dispute between the conflicting sides since September 1991, when the pos-
sibility of posting peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia was only a remote pos-
sibility. The Croatian authorities demanded their deployment along the inter-
nationally-recognized borders, while Belgrade and the rebel Serbs insisted on 
the ceasefire line. Ultimately, a compromise solution was found: peacekeeping 
troops were deployed along both lines, and in between them, although not in 
equal measure. So the UNPA concept necessarily constituted a vital deviation 
from the established buffer zone concept. Even so, the operations of UN peace-
keeping forces in Croatia points to the conclusion that much greater attention 
was accorded to supervision of the ceasefire line than the status inside the UN-
PAs or surveillance of traffic on Croatia’s borders. For example, at the end of 
January 1992, UN Under-secretary General Goulding told the rebel Serbs that 
the demilitarization of the entire territory of the RSK should not be insisted 
upon, “but rather from both frontlines. This should be 5 km on each side of 
the front”.47 By the same token, a key provision of the ceasefire agreement of 
March 1994 was in fact the establishment of a 2 km-wide buffer zone between 
the two sides, over which the UN peacekeepers were supposed to place un-
der their control.48 The entire agreement, according to the interpretations of 
the peacekeeping force command itself in Zagreb, rested on the “deployment 
of UN forces between Croat and Serb forces inside the buffer zone”.49 Inside 
UNPA West, peacekeeping forces were oriented toward controlling the contact 
line between the respective territories held by Croatian forces and rebel Serb 
forces.50 The marked orientation of UN peacekeeping forces toward separating 
the conflicting sides was therefore clearly apparent. It may thus be concluded 
that the introduction of the UNPA concept as a modification of the classic 
buffer zone did not prove successful. However, all of the problems involved in 
traditional peacekeeping operations were well known even prior to the com-
mencement of the UN peacekeeping mission in Croatia, while the excessive 
dependency on the earlier experiences of UN buffer zones was actually one of 
these problems.51 Even so, the failure of the UNPA concept may also be viewed 
in a different light. Set up as a compromise between the mutually exclusive 
Croatian and Serbian positions on the deployment sites of UN peacekeepers, 
47 M. Rupić, ed., Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-doku-
mentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2008), Document no. 65, Report of the JNA 9th Corps 
command, 2nd Military District, on the meeting between Milan Babić and UN envoy Marrack 
Goulding and the positions taken, 28 February 1992, III: p. 168.
48 “Sporazum o prekidu vatre”, Večernji list, Zagreb, 31 March 1994.
49 Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MVPEIRH), Zagreb, Croa-
tian Government (VRH)/UNPROFOR and European Community Monitoring Mission Office 
(UUNPFPMEZ), UNPROFOR/Headquarters Zagreb (HQZG), Implementation of Ceasefire 
Agreement of 30 March 1994.
50 M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, pp. 257-258.
51 John MacKinlay, “Military Responses to Complex Emergencies”, The United Nations and 
Civil Wars, Thomas G. Weiss, ed. (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995), p. 55.
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the UNPAs were undermined by the UN itself from the very start. After all, 
the UN peacekeepers had in a way just taken the place of the JNA in the role of 
protecting the rebel Croatian Serbs, so the concentration on physical separa-
tion was simply a logical consequence of this stance.
Probably the most important feature of traditional peacekeeping operations 
is the limited possibility for the use of force (arms). With rare exceptions, the 
UN peace keeping units could use force solely for self defence. This implies 
its use exclusively against military forces, its temporary nature (response to 
attack) and its extent which should be in proportion to the severity of the 
attack that precipitated its use.52 According to the Vance Plan, the armed 
members of the UN peacekeeping force could employ force only “as a last 
resort and, naturally, only in self-defence”.53 Other opinions are nonetheless 
available. For example, according to American authors W.J. Durch and James 
A. Scheare, UN peacekeepers in Croatia could have used force even outside of 
the narrow confines of self-defence, i.e., to defend the territory and resident 
population entrusted to them in case of direct attack, and to resist armed 
attempts aimed at preventing peacekeepers from performing their duties 
and military or paramilitary attacks in the UNPAs.54 UN Security Council 
Resolution 807 of February 1993, adopted after the Croatian military operation 
in the Zadar hinterland, may be cited as something of a confirmation of this 
assertion. Among other things, it contains the demand that both sides adhere 
to the ceasefire; the demand is accompanied by a reference to chapter seven 
of the UN Charter.55 The latter foresees the use of force in situations deemed 
a threat to international peace and security.56 In the aforementioned case of 
Resolution 807, this obviously meant the possibility of using force, either by 
changing the rules of engagement of the peacekeeping forces themselves in 
order to expand the right to use of force, or via outside armed intervention for 
the purpose of assisting UN peacekeepers under the aegis of the UN Security 
Council. During the period under observation, none of these possibilities were 
exploited; the use of armed force by UN peacekeepers in Croatia remained 
with in the constraints imposed by the Vance Plan. This assessment was not 
even altered by several armed incidents between Croatian forces and the UN 
Canadian Battalion (CANBAT)57 in the area of the Medak Pocket, which 
52 B. Milisavljević, Nove mirovne misije, pp. 45-49.
53 Balkanski ugovorni odnosi, Document no. 525, Vance Plan: UN peacekeeping plan for Yugo-
slavia, Geneva, 3 January 1992, p. 528.
54 W. J. Durch, James A. Scheare, “Faultlines: UN Operations in the Former Yugoslavia”, UN 
Peacekeeping, p. 210.
55 The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia (New York: United Nations – 
Department of Public Information, 1996), p. 147.
56 Ibid., p. 239.
57 Hereinafter, when specifying individual infantry battalions of the UN peacekeeping forces, I 
shall use either an acronym as the one cited here or the general term for the residents of the state 
from which the relevant unit came (in this case Canadians).
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occurred in September 1993. For according to available information, this was 
more of a chance skirmish caused by a misunderstanding between the civilian 
and military components of the UN peacekeeping mission and the misguided 
desire of the Canadians for some form of combat.58 In other words, CANBAT 
did not use armed force to impose a provision of the Vance Plan or any other 
agreement. The most important reason for avoidance of active use of force was 
the view that it could have led to loss of the UN peacekeeping force’s neutrality. 
This could have then engendered a hostile stance among one of the parties 
to the conflict, thereby threatening the safety of peacekeepers in the field. 
Imposition, particularly if it is implemented by armed force, always implies a 
certain risk, and, as noted, “the Security Council and the countries that have 
sent [peacekeeping] troops did not want to expose their personnel to harm by 
use of force”.59 The limited right to use of force and the exercise of this right 
relegated almost exclusively to self-defence by UN peacekeepers were perhaps 
the most important features of the peacekeeping operation in Croatia. In this 
sense, the assertions made by Durch and Scheare were probably accurate, 
but the problem was that this aforementioned authorization to use force was 
obviously more of a guideline than an explicit order. The UN peacekeeping 
forces in Croatia were not a classic combat force; the other side of the coin was 
that the existing possibility of going beyond this framework was not exploited.
The Mandate of UN Peacekeeping Forces in Croatia, 1992-1995
The UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia were established on the basis of 
the UN Security Council Resolution of 21 February 1992. The first designation 
for it was United Nations Protection Force – UNPROFOR.60 In March 1995, 
as a result of new political circumstances, the designation was changed in 
line with the new designation for entire peace operation: United Nations 
Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia – UNCRO.61 Their tasks were 
stipulated first and foremost by the Vance Plan. Here it was specified that the 
peacekeeping forces would ensure the demilitarization of the UNPAs and 
safeguard the remaining civilian population, oversee the work of local police 
forces and render support to the return of displaced persons and refugees. 
58 Cf. Davor Marijan, “Hrvatsko ratište 1990.-1995.”, in:  Dražen Budiša, ed., Stvaranje hrvatske 
države i Domovinski rat, (Zagreb: Hrvatski institut za povijest and Školska knjiga, 2006), 164; 
Miroslav Međimorec, “Medački džep – prijepori”, National Security and the Future, 5 (2004), no. 
1: 7-305.
59 M. Nobilo, Hrvatski feniks, p. 259.
60 Ibid, Document no. 531, Formation of UNPROFOR (Resolution 743), 21 February 1992, pp. 
564-566.
61 Vladimir Drobnjak, “Priznanje imena i teritorijalne cjelovitosti Hrvatske u Ujedinjenim 
narodima kroz razdoblja djelovanja UN-a na teritoriju Republike Hrvatske”, Zbornik Diplomat-
ske akademije (ZDI), 2 (1997), no. 2: 127.
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During 1992, the initial mandate of the peacekeeping forces was expanded 
considerably. First, under UN Security Council Resolution 762 of 30 June 
1992, the jurisdiction of the peacekeeping forces was enlarged to encompass 
areas outside of the agreed UNPA boundaries which were, with a few minor 
exceptions, generally under the control of the JNA and the Serbian rebels. 
These areas were called ‘pink zones’, and the UN peacekeepers in them had 
the same mission as those in the UNPAs. In August 1992, the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 769, whereby the UN peacekeeping forces assumed control 
of passenger and freight traffic at the borders between the UNPAs and Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia. UN Security Council Resolution 779 of October 1992 
called for the UNPROFOR to assume the supervision of the JNA’s withdrawal 
from and the demilitarization of the Prevlaka Peninsula. In November 1992, 
as part of enforcement of a military no-flight zone above Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
UNPROFOR military monitors were deployed with the task of overseeing 
airports in Croatia.62 The content of the UN peacekeeping mandate remained 
the same over the course of 1993. During 1994, the Croatian authorities and 
the rebel Serbs concluded agreements on a ceasefire and the normalization 
of economic relations (December 1994), in which the UNPROFOR 
participated exclusively as a provider of good services (securing channels of 
communication). Upon their conclusion, the UNPROFOR assumed the task 
of overseeing their implementation, but even this did not entail an expansion 
of the responsibilities assumed under the Vance Plan, for this was essentially a 
mere expansion of their monitoring/supervisory duties. For example, pursuant 
to the ceasefire agreement of March 1994, the UNPROFOR was supposed to 
establish full control over the newly-established buffer zone (demilitarization, 
establishment of checkpoints, patrolling and supervision of police activities).63 
Pursuant to the economic agreement of December 1994, the UNPROFOR, 
among other things, was tasked with supervision of passenger traffic on the 
Zagreb-Belgrade motorway which, again, did not exceed the extent of the 
security responsibilities assumed under the Vance Plan. The establishment 
of the UNCRO in March 1995 only emphasized the earlier mandates even 
more, particularly those concerning control and supervision of Croatia’s 
borders.64 A major organizational change occurred in October 1993, when 
separate UNPROFOR command headquarters were established for Croatia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.65 However, besides separating the until 
then unified UN peacekeeping force mandate into three distinct operations, 
there was no change to the content of their mission. The establishment of the 
UNCRO stressed even more that the peacekeeping operation was proceeding 
within Croatia’s borders, but the UNPROFOR’s successor did not have any 
62 The United Nations, pp. 4., 7.
63 “Sporazum o prekidu vatre”, Večernji list, 31 March 1994.
64 V. Drobnjak, “Priznanje”, p. 128.
65 The United Nations, pp. 219.-222.
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different operative tasks. The UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia over the 
entire period under observation could thus be assessed as an operation to 
implement the somewhat modified Vance Plan.
Blue Helmets, or Some Other Features of the UN Forces in Croatia
The UN peacekeeping forces consisted of military, military-monitoring 
and civilian components, which applied to both the UNPROFOR and UNCRO. 
The most numerous were the members of the military component, in which 
the basic organizational unit was the infantry battalion. The deployment of 
UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia was completed by the end of June 1992. 
Infantry battalions from Belgium/Luxembourg and Russia were posted in 
Sector East, infantry battalions from Canada, Argentina, Nepal and Jordan 
were posted in Sector West, infantry battalions from Denmark, Nigeria and 
Poland were posted in Sector North, while infantry battalions from the Czech 
Republic, France and Kenya were posted in Sector South. Small logistics, 
engineering, construction and medical units, as well as other peace mission 
support staff, were deployed with them.66 In March 1995, the status was rather 
different, for only Sector East did not see any changes in the UN peacekeeping 
battalions. The Canadian battalion was transferred from Sector West to Sector 
South (in 1993), Jordanian and Ukrainian infantry battalions were deployed 
in Sector North to replace the Nigerians, while in Sector South, in addition to 
the aforementioned Canadian infantry battalion, another Jordanian battalion 
was deployed to replace the French. At that point, there were almost sixteen 
thousand UN peacekeeping troops in Croatia.67 Only the UN peacekeepers 
could be said to have signified, in the fullest sense of the word, the presence 
of the international community in Croatia. The arrival of such a large number 
of people constituted an entirely new experience for Croatia. Local Croatian 
officials had to deal with the fact that there would be confrontations between 
such different cultures, languages, faiths, traditions and customs. So the 
practical consequences of such diversity were inevitable. “If, for example, you 
make a sausage” – it was noted – “in which you mix ground pork and beef, you 
can’t give it to either a Jordanian or a Nepalese, since the former don’t eat pork, 
while the latter don’t eat beef ”.68
The success of traditional peacekeeping operations has always depended 
upon, among other things, the authority and credibility of the UN peacekeeping 
66 UNDOC, S/24353, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 
762 (1992), 27 July 1992, UNPROFOR Deployment as of July 1992.
67 UNDOC  S/1995/222, Report of the Security-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolu-
tion 947 (1994), 22 March 1995, UNPROFOR Deployment as of March 1995.
68 Slavica Bakić, “‘Daruvarski sporazum’ razbjesnio je drugu stranu!”, Glas Slavonije, 7 March 
1994.
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troops. For their very presence in easily recognizable uniforms with blue 
helmets, prominent insignia of the organization they represent and the visible 
bearing of arms were supposed to considerably blunt the radical behaviour 
of the conflicting sides. In their actions, members of the UN peacekeeping 
forces therefore had to merge the qualities of military demeanour and 
the moral integrity of a neutral peacekeeper. Impartiality in conduct and 
performance of duties was paramount. Members of the UN peacekeeping 
forces at all levels of command and at all levels of engagement had to comport 
themselves impartially, and had to be perceived as such.69 Members of the UN 
peacekeeping forces had to approach their tasks “without apportioning blame, 
judging standpoints or favouring either side”.70 Assuming the role of arbiter or 
even delving into the merits of a dispute were expressly prohibited.71 Even so, it 
was precisely in this area that the UN peacekeepers demonstrated their greatest 
weakness. Particularly devastating was the fact that the tendency of discarding 
neutrality occurred in the highest UN administrative structures. In general, 
the loss of neutrality to the benefit of taking pro-Serbian positions was very 
widespread. Marrack Goulding may rightfully be deemed the standard-bearer 
of such tendencies. His claim that the Republic of Croatia as mentioned in UN 
documents was only a geographic term often served as confirmation of this.72 
New documents only reinforce such assessments. At the end of January 1992, 
he thus told Milan Babić that “they should not refer to the territory of the RS 
[Republic of Serbian] Krajina as the territory of the R. [Republic of] Croatia”; 
although he noted that this would be difficult for Zagreb to accept, he added 
that he did not think “that this could not be resolved”.73 Goulding’s words may 
not have been accompanied by specific action and they were probably in the 
service of the wider British strategy for dealing with the conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia by courting favour with Belgrade, but they certainly enhanced the 
already existing aspirations of the so-called RSK to secede from Croatia which, 
obviously, did not comply with the international community’s official policy. 
By the same token, it is not difficult to imagine their influence on the conduct 
of the UN peace mission.
The Russian infantry battalion, as already stated, was deployed in Sector 
East, the border zone between Croatia and Serbia. At the end of March 1993, 
the commander of the Russian battalion at the time, General Yuri Sosedov, 
told the BBC that the training centre for the paramilitary commanded by 
69 Peacekeeper’s Handbook (Elmsford, NY, 1984), p. 377.
70 Nina Vajić, “Mirovne operacije Ujedinjenih naroda – plavi šljemovi”, Zbornik Pravnog 
fakulteta u Zagrebu, Zagreb, 41 (1991), no. 6: 548.
71 Biljana Đurđević, “‘Oči i uši’ UNPROFOR-a”, Vojska, 10 March 1993.
72  G.-H. Ahrens, Diplomacy, p. 515.
73  Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat, Document no. 65, Report of the JNA 9th Corps Com-
mand, 2nd Military District, on the meeting between Milan Babić and UN envoy Marrack 
Goulding and the positions taken, 28 February 1992, III: p. 168.
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Željko ‘Arkan’ Ražnjatović in that sector was nothing more than “a training 
centre at which young recruits pass through and then go to other regions” and 
that “it has no influence on the situation in that part of the Sector”.74 In Octo-
ber 1994, an official inquiry into RUSBAT’s activities was conducted, and the 
findings indicated that its troops were involved in “black market speculation, 
associating with war criminals, running of brothels, and firing mortar shells at 
civilians”.75 The deployment of RUSBAT to the border with Serbia, which was 
believed to enjoy open Russian sympathy, was then noted as an mistaken deci-
sion by the Security Council.76
Besides political pragmatism, a major source of undermining the prin-
ciple of neutrality, again to Serbian benefit, was the view of those members of 
the UN peacekeeping mission who believed that communist Yugoslavia was 
simply an outstanding political and strategic project. According to the first 
UNPROFOR commander in Croatia, Satish Nambiar of India, a powerful Yu-
goslav state constituted, within the context of the end of communism in East-
ern Europe, a potential threat to the political ambitions of Western Europe 
headed by a reunified Germany. Consequently, Germany, Austria, Hungary, 
Italy and even the Vatican encouraged the nationalist-secessionist tendencies 
of the Slovenes and Croats, which again provoked the justified Serbian belief 
that they were in fact the greatest victims of this new German conspiracy in 
the Balkans.77 The new states in south-east Europe therefore upset some sort 
of desired geopolitical balance. The logical consequence of such views had to 
be an acute sensitivity to the political objectives of the rebel Serbs in Croatia.
Certain other factors also impeded the maintenance of a neutral stance. 
Since most of the peacekeepers were deployed in the territory under rebel 
Serb control, it was impossible to avoid a certain identification with their 
views. According to one of the peacekeeping force commanders, Jean Cot, 
the UNPROFOR in the manner obtained the opportunity to become familiar 
with the mentality of the Serbs.78 Finally, the ambiguities in the peacekeeping 
74 MVPEIRH, VRH/National UNPROFOR Commission (DKUNPF), Class.: 004-01/93-01/01, 
Ref. no. 50303-93-9, Protest of 25 March 1993.
75 Dokumenti, Prilozi, Bill Gertz, “UN traži povlačenje ruskih trupa zbog zločina u Hrvatskoj”, 
Washington Times, 20 October 1994, p. 152.
76 Susan R. Lamb, “The UN Protection Force in Former Yugoslavia”, in: Ramesh Thakur, Car-
lyle A. Thayee, eds., A Crisis of Expectations. UN Peacekeeping in the 1990s, (London: Westview 
Press, 1995), p. 69.
77 Satish Nambiar, “UN peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia – from UNPROFOR 
to Kosovo”, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement 
(Ramesh Thakur, Albrecht Schnabel, eds.) (New York: United Nations University Press, 2001), 
pp. 169-170.
78 Croatian Ministry of Defence (MORH), Zagreb, Central Military Archives (SVA), Croatian 
Army Main Staff (GSHV), UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitoring Mission 
Liaison Office (UUNPFPMEZ), Osijek Departmental Office (OUO), Class: 81/93-01/91, Ref. 
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mandate – visible from the very start – were also essential. As early as 
February 1992, the Canadian commander of the preceding peace mission, 
John Wilson, told a television station in Belgrade that the primary task of the 
UN peacekeeping forces in Croatia would be there to protect the local Serbs.79 
Wilson’s awkward statement, which was immediately denied, reflected the 
very roots of the Vance Plan, which implicitly contained the tendency of pro-
Serbian clientelism. The problem of maintaining neutrality may not have been 
as notable had something of a balance of favouritism had been established. 
However, available sources do not confirm this assumption. The rebel Serbs, 
for example, believed the Argentine battalion posted in Sector West openly 
favoured the Croatian side. In August 1993, ARGBAT was proclaimed 
undesirable in the territory of the RSK.80 The Argentines did in fact inform the 
Croatian side that “the outlook of the Argentine person is very similar to that of 
the Croats” and that they were cognizant “of the struggle of the Croats against 
the socialist regime”.81 However, their conduct was in no way comparable to 
that of – for example – RUSBAT.
It would nevertheless be mistaken to consider pro-Serbian clientelism 
the most important determinant of the operations of the UN peacekeepers 
in Croatia, although its influence can neither be underestimated. However, a 
high number of clearly apparent improvisations, fumbling and a notable affin-
ity for bureaucratism in approaches resulted from a lack of knowledge and lack 
of familiarity with the basic facts of the deployment region, shoddy prepara-
tion, inadequate resources, insufficient discipline and gradual acceptance of a 
conformist position. Ignorance was widespread at all levels. Goulding himself 
acknowledged that he had only a vague grasp of the complexity of ethnic rela-
tions in Yugoslavia.82 It was therefore not surprising that this ignorance often 
assumed alarming features at lower decision-making levels. In February 1995, 
after almost three years of experience, a Nepalese officer at a bridge crossing 
near Stara Gradiška “asked on which side of the Sava River Croatia is located”.83 
This ignorance was due to a shocking lack of preparation. Even the proverbially 
well-prepared Canadians, after receiving deployment orders, did not have any 
maps of Yugoslavia at their disposal.84 The discrepancies in quality between the 
79 MVPEIRH, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, UN/United Nations Mission of Liaison Officers (UNM-
LO), Statement of John Wilson of 24 February 1992.
80 Croatian Memorial Documentation Centre (HMDCDR), Zagreb, Republic of Serbian Kraji-
na (RSK), 18th Corps of the Serbian Army of Krajina (SVK)/Command (K18.k), Inv. no. 18-802, 
Protest letter of 30 August 1993.
81 MVPEIRH, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, Civilian Affairs Coordinator for Sector West (KCSZ), Re-
port from the meeting of the police, Croatian Army representatives and the Sector West Civilian 
Affairs Coordinator with ARGBAT commander Lt. Col. Bendini of 31 August 1993.
82 M. Goulding, Peacemonger, p. 299.
83 V. H., “Gdje je Hrvatska?”, Glas Slavonije, 27 February 1995.
84 Sean M. Maloney, John Llambs, eds., Chances for Peace: Canadian Soldiers in the Balkans 
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UN peacekeeping infantry battalions was also striking. The Canadians were 
appalled at the level of gear used by NEPBAT, such as, for example, the absence 
of suitable winter attire.85 Croatian observers found NIGBAT’s organization of 
checkpoints in Sector North amateurish in comparison to that of the Danes.86 
To the French in Sector South, the Kenyan battalion did not even leave the 
impression of a respectable military formation: they spent most of their time 
sleeping, and did not even bother to set up an effective patrol system.87 While 
poor equipment was a characteristic of the battalions from largely underdevel-
oped Asian and African countries, a lack of discipline characterized them all. 
Alcoholism, provocation of physical altercations, prostitution, illicit drug con-
sumption and involvement in smuggling were widespread phenomena. For 
example, a UN special investigative commission ascertained at the end of the 
1993 that, among other things, “there is firm evidence that the UNPROFOR 
has smuggled fuel, primarily in UNPA Sectors South and North”.88 The opera-
tion of motor vehicles while intoxicated in particular left a poor impression. 
An UNCRO police officer perpetrated several consecutive traffic infractions 
in Vinkovci in mid-July 1995 while under the obvious influence of alcohol; 
since he refused to stop even after repeated calls to do so, he had to be forced to 
comply.89 The Slovak engineering unit troops were the most candid; they told 
a Croatian interlocutor that participation in the peacekeeping mission was 
an ideal opportunity for career advancement and high earnings, particularly 
since the UN covered most of their expenses.90 Such conduct undoubtedly cost 
the peacekeeping forces a considerable loss of integrity.
The UN soldier was precisely the individual with whom local residents 
most often made contact. So the success of any peacekeeping mission depends 
on how successfully such a soldier brings together military professionalism 
and an authentic concern for the needs of the local civilian population. The 
UN peacekeeper therefore has to exude a commitment to the success of the 
peacekeeping mission, ambassadorial comportment, professorial restraint and 
85 Ibid., 134.
86 MVPEIRH, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, MORH/GSHV/Karlovac Operational Zone Command 
(ZZPK), Class.: 8/93-01/250, Ref. no.: 1078-01/1-90-1, Notice on organization of UN check-
points and monitoring points of 23 August 1993.
87 MVPEIRH, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, MORH/GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/Sector South Department 
(OSJ), Report of 1 December 1992.
88 MVPEIRH, Multilateral Administration (UML)/Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cro-
atia to the United Nations (SMRHUN), no. 61-01/94, Note on the report of the Special Commis-
sion of Inquiry into the Counter-legal Conduct of the UNPROFOR of 26 January 1994.
89 MVPEIRH, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ/Croatian Ministry of Interior, Zagreb (MUPRH)/Police 
Sector (SP), no. 511-01-10/1-758-14-36086/95 FP, Notice of 17 July 1995.
90 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/Liaison officer for Šibenik, Extraordinary report 
of 27 January 1993.
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professional military bearing in equal parts.91 The impressions left by the UN 
peacekeeping forces in Croatia often fell short of this framework.
The UNPROFOR and the Demilitarization of the Protected Zones
By far the most important provisions of the Vance Plan dealt with demili-
tarization of the areas under UN protection. All armed forces in them had to 
either withdraw or disband, and the task of the UN peacekeeping forces was to 
see that such areas remained demilitarized. Their arms had to be removed from 
the UNPAs either during withdrawal of the JNA and Croatian forces or turned 
over to the UN peacekeepers. Closely tied to this, all regular military units 
in the UNPAs had to be decommissioned, while all paramilitary or volunteer 
forces had to either withdraw from the UNPAs or disband. The bearing of 
sidearms was permitted only for local police officers.92 Demilitarization meant 
that at the moment the peacekeepers assumed responsibility, there could be 
no uniformed soldiers nor armed civilians in the UNPAs. Thereafter, in the 
words of Argentine Luis Lagos, insofar “as we find anyone with arms without 
an UNPROFOR permit, they would be seized”.93 The successful demilitariza-
tion of the UN protected areas was supposed to prevent the renewed outbreak 
of war, which was a key prerequisite for implementation of the remaining tasks 
entrusted to the peacekeeping forces.
The prospects for successful demilitarization of the future UN protected 
areas were crucially undermined even before the UN peacekeeping forces as-
sumed responsibility for them. The first obstacle was set up by the JNA. Based 
on the Vance’s negotiation efforts from early 1992, it was obliged to with-
draw from the territory of the Republic of Croatia. In the following months 
it largely did so, but at the same time it organized the military forces of the 
rebel Serbs, i.e., the Territorial Defence (TO) units and militia units, supply-
ing them with arms and other military matériel. It also organized the staff of 
these forces along similar lines. Up to early June 1992, increasingly larger JNA 
units were withdrawn from Croatia’s territory, but over two hundred tanks 
and several thousand artillery pieces of varying calibre, among other things, 
were left behind for the rebel Serbs.94 To be sure, most members of the rebel 
Serb TO were decommissioned, but it was foreseen that after the UN peace-
keeping forces assumed their responsibility, they would operate at the level of 
command staffs (peacetime organization). For example, in early May 1992, 
TO units in western and eastern Slavonia were disbanded, and they were or-
dered to turn over their weapons, but in a manner “that each soldier knew 
91 Michael O’Connor, “Policing the Peace”, United Nations Peacekeeping,p. 65.
92 Ujedinjeni narodi. Rezolucije, Vanceov plan, pp. 70, 73-75.
93 Tanja Božić, Diana Šetka, “Povratak pod kapom UNPROFOR-a”, Arena, 25 July 1992.
94 D. Marijan, Slom, pp. 393-400.
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where his arms were located”.95 The disbanding of the TO units was therefore 
only temporary in character, as the decommissioned members could again be 
called to active service, and their arms were at their disposal. By contrast, the 
militia (police) units, which were permitted under the Vance Plan, continued 
to function after their reorganization in February and March 1992. Even so, 
already in early 1992, within the scope of the RSK internal affairs system, the 
Special Militia Units (PJM) began to be formed, and these – within the context 
of the decommissioning of the TO – assumed the tasks of a classic military 
force.96 The reinforcement of the military and militia forces of the rebel Serbs 
in terms of arms and personnel, the superficial disbanding of the TO units 
and the organization of the PJM brigades were facts well known to the UN. 
Boutros-Ghali’s report to the UN Security Council in June 1992 stated that the 
high number of Serbian irregular forces were obviously “absorbed into the lo-
cal territorial defence, while in individual cases they were also taken in by the 
police in the UNPAs”, which was preceded by a JNA decision “that a majority 
portion of these arms, including heavy weapons, be assigned to these forces 
prior to withdrawal from the UNPAs”.97 The lack of a decisive response to the 
undermining of one of the most important provisions of the Vance Plan would 
later have immense repercussions.
From May to July 1992, UN peacekeepers assumed responsibility in all 
four protected areas. Once this responsibility was assumed, the UNPROFOR 
mediated in the refinement of the agreements which foresaw the gradual de-
militarization of individual sectors. Besides belief in the cooperation of both 
sides, which mostly pertained to the Serbian side – for besides a part of Sec-
tor West the remaining sectors largely corresponded to the extent of Serbian 
conquest in 1991 – the UNPROFOR had no other assurances at its disposal. 
The extent of Serbian obstruction of the demilitarization process was patently 
apparent. At the beginning of November 1992, the general assessment in Sec-
tor East was that there were concealed weapons everywhere, and the UNPRO-
FOR was unable to search the entire territory of this sector. In Sectors North 
and South, the disarming of paramilitary groups had still not commenced.98 
Demilitarization went the farthest in Sector West, so by the end of June 1992 
Croatian forces were withdrawn from it, while in early July the Serbian TO 
95 Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat, Document no. 209, Command of the Main Staff of the 
TO RSK to the Zone Staff of the West Slavonia TO and the Zone Staff of the East Slavonia TO on 
the dissolution of existing and formation of new command staffs and Territorial Defence units 
of the RSK and the turnover of command zones to the militia forces of the RSK and UNPRO-
FOR dated 7 May 1992, III: p. 457.
96 N. Barić, Srpska pobuna, pp. 348-349.
97 Balkanski ugovorni odnosi, Document no. 539, Report of Secretary General Boutros-Ghali to 
the Security Council of 15 June 1992, III: p. 592.
98  Croatian State Archives (HDA), Zagreb, Office of the Croatian President (UPRH), Technical 
Unit (TJ) 322, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, Class.: 800-01-92-01/05, Ref. no: 5030107-92-108, Report 
on the status of and some issues concerning peacekeeping operations of 3 November 1992.
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had largely been decommissioned.99 A relative success was achieved when the 
heavy artillery and other arms of the Serbian TO was withdrawn to depots. It 
was placed in storage in Sectors East, West and North in early November 1992, 
while in Sector South it was only pulled back from the former frontline. Heavy 
arms were placed under “double lock and key”, i.e. one key was held by the 
relevant UNPROFOR commander, while the other by the counterpart Serbian 
TO commander. 100
The first mandate of the UN peacekeeping forces expired in the first half of 
February 1993. By that time, the basic weaknesses of the Vance Plan crystal-
lized where this pertained to the demilitarization of the protected areas. First, 
the rebel Serbs obviously did not intend to turn over all arms to UN forces, 
nor disband all units not permitted under the Vance Plan. In this regard, the 
greatest threat was posed by their special militia units. In Boutros-Ghali’s re-
port to the Security Council in October 1992, it was noted that the root of the 
deteriorating situation in the UNPAs was the decision of the authorities in 
Knin “to create new paramilitary forces”, which was a “brutal violation of the 
UN peace plan”.101 The aforementioned paramilitaries were the RSK special 
militia units (PJM brigade). For example, after being warned by the Belgians 
that his unit had to be disarmed and dissolved by the end of July 1992, the PJM 
commander in Beli Manastir reported to his superiors in Knin that he would 
not “comply with the demand of the UNPROFOR Command, even at the cost 
of resorting to the force of arms”.102 Even regular militia units refused to turn 
over their sidearms.103 A considerable quantity of heavy arms were also con-
cealed outside of the official depots. At the end of July 1992, there were four 
such secret depots in the Benkovac area; in one of them, the rebel Serbs hid an 
entire battery of mortars with projectiles and vehicles, while their crews were 
on constant combat alert.104 In the part of Sector West under Croatian control, 
the UNPROFOR also sent several protests to the Croatian police authorities 
99 HMDCDR, RSK, Western Slavonia Territorial Defence Zone Staff (ZŠTOZS), Press informa-
tion of 3 July 1992.
100 HDA, UPRH/TJ 322, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, Class.: 800-01-92-01/05, Ref. no.: 5030107-92-
108, Report on the status of and some issues concerning peacekeeping operations of 3 Novem-
ber 1992.
101 HDA, UPRH/Archives (P)/Folder (F) 349, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Croatia to 
the United Nations (SMRHUN), Analysis of all resolutions of the Security Council and General 
Assembly, dated 23 October 1992.
102 HMDCDR, RSK, MUP/Special Militia Unit Command in Beli Manastir, Conf. no. 4-2, Re-
port on the critical situation between PJM command and UNPROFOR, dated 27 July 1992.
103 M. Rupić, ed., Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-doku-
mentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2009). Document no. 59, Letter from the UN Civilian 
Affairs Administrator to the RSK Defence Ministry on carrying and storing of arms, dated 23 
July 1992, V: pp. 99-100.
104 Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat, Document no. 68, Report on the storage of arms, 
equipment and matériel, dated 31 July 1992, V: p. 117.
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due to the carrying of infantry rifles, particularly in the Pakrac-Lipik area.105 
In Sector East, after it became obvious that the UNPROFOR would not use 
force to seize the arms of the local militia, the Croatian Army simply refused 
to withdraw to the specified line five kilometres from the boundary of the UN-
PA.106 The period under observation allowed for a conclusion as to how far the 
UN peacekeeping forces were prepared to go in disarmament campaigns. One 
of Nambiar’s statements made in April 1992 should have served as sufficient 
warning. When asked by a Croatian journalist if he was prepared to order his 
troops to take decisive action in the seizure of arms, insofar as this problem 
arose, his response was: “May I answer that question when this need arises?”.107 
The UNPROFOR did not have an effective response when this need actually 
arose several months later. The most common method was to warn the rebel 
Serbs that refusal to disarm was an open violation of the Vance Plan and pre-
vention of its implementation. The military officers of the rebel Serb were thus 
warned that the UNPROFOR knew of “a high number of people who wore the 
uniforms of the JNA, then the uniforms of the TO, and now wear the uniforms 
of the so-called militia” and they were implored not to transform the “UN 
protected zone in a ‘police state’”.108 Some more decisive steps were also taken. 
In Sector East, RUSBAT blockaded several militia stations, but the Serbs re-
fused to turn over their arms; further action was halted by Nambiar based on 
assurances he had allegedly received from Knin.109 In Sector West in October 
and November 1992, the Canadians were involved “in a series of cordons and 
searches of Serbian militia stations”.110 Nonetheless, after intervention from 
Knin and a demonstrative muster of militia troops in Okučani, even the Ca-
nadians backed down. Instead, both sides were offered a ten-day amnesty (15 
to 25 December 1992), but only in the wider Pakrac environs, in which they 
could turn over their arms or remove them from the UNPA.111 No sanctions 
were foreseen in case of refusal to comply. It may be concluded that some arms 
were seized in these and similar campaigns, but it was obvious that the latter 
105  Croatian Interior Ministry (MUPRH), Zagreb, Bjelovar-Bilogora Police Administration 
(PUBB)/Operational Action for Return (OAP), Report of the Pakrac Police Station, dated 11 
July 1992.
106  MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/Osijek Operational Zone Command (ZOZO), Class.: 
035-01/92-01/05, Ref. no: 1076-01-34-92-09, Extraordinary report of 6 August 1992.
107  P. Š., “UNPROFOR po planu”, Večernji list, 2 April 1992.
108  Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat, Document no. 80, Response to UNPROFOR – Sector 
North Command to RSK Defence Minister Stojan Španović on tensions in the field and differ-
ing interpretations of the UNPROFOR mandate by his command and RSK authorities, dated 8 
August 1992, V: pp. 135-136.
109  MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/ZOZO, Class.: 035-01/92-01/05, Ref. no.: 1076-01-34-
92-06, Extraordinary report of 31 July 1992.
110  HMDCDR, RSK, ZŠTOZS, No.: 183-14, Letter to CANBAT of 1 December 1992.
111  MUPRH, PUBB/OAP, Letter from the Canadian battalion commander 1 of 2 December 
1992.
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were more demonstrative in character; after all, none of them were conceived 
as permanent. The key problem consisted of the fact that the peacekeeping 
forces could not vouchsafe anything, not even for those successes in demili-
tarization that were only secured after great difficulty. In early November 1992 
the tensions in Sector North were seething, and the UNPROFOR commander 
could barely manage to halt Serb attempts to break into arms depots.112
Nobody, however, could have predicted that this unsatisfactory result by 
the UNPROFOR in the demilitarization of the protected zones during the 
peacekeeping force’s first mandate, which expired in the latter half of February 
1993, would prove to be their best capability in this sense. For in the latter half 
of January 1993, Croatian forces liberated the wider Novigrad environs, parts 
of the Zadar hinterland and the area of the Peruča Dam.113 The response of the 
rebel Serbs was predictable; in Sectors East, North and South they broke into 
the common weapons depots and seized the heavy weaponry. In Sector East, 
about thirty Serbian tanks were demonstratively placed on the UNPA bound-
ary, occupying the Bijelo Brdo-Sarvaš line; “When asked how they conceived 
of their ‘double key’ obligation, the members of UNPROFOR’s RUSBAT re-
sponded that the principle is sound, but the ‘lock’ is faulty”.114 In Sector North, 
the Serbs mobilized their units, seized the arms from joint depots and occu-
pied positions along the UNPA boundaries.115 The opinion of the commander 
of UNPROFOR’s Czech infantry battalion in May 1993 was that in Lika the 
conditions for implementation of demilitarization did not exist.116 the only 
sector in which they did not break into the joint arms depots was West; but 
even here this depended on special assurances given to them by the UNPRO-
FOR commander and the refusal of a local TO commander to obey orders 
from Knin.117 Nevertheless, there was a general mobilization of TO troops, and 
they were armed with infantry rifles and they took up defensive positions.118 
Moreover, the UNPROFOR troops themselves were placed in jeopardy. For 
example, the Kenyan battalion was “in total disarray”, and its commander in 
mortal danger; he could not return to Benkovac and limited himself to the 
grounds of an UNPROFOR station “like an ordinary soldier so he could be 
112 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/Department for Sector North (OSS), Class.: 804-
01/92-02/07, Ref. no: 2133-01-92-06, Notes from the meeting held on 10 November 1992 of 12 
November 1992.
113 D. Marijan, “Hrvatsko ratište”, pp. 159-162.
114 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OUO, Class.: 81/93-02/01, Ref. no.: 1076-18-93-29, 
Extraordinary report of 23 January 1993.
115 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSS, Class.: 035-08/93-01/01, Ref. no.: 1078-08/1-93-
19, Regular report for 31 Jan. 1993 dated 31 January 1993.
116 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/Lika, Report of 13 May 1993.
117 MORH, SVA, GSHV, Report of Croatian Air Force and Anti-aircraft Defence Commander to 
the Croatian President dated 12 February 1993.
118 HMDCDR, RSK/SVK, 51st Infantry Brigade Command, Confidential no.: 45-1, Operational 
report of 1 February 1993.
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more easily concealed”.119 According to the UN peacekeeping force com-
mander, Frenchman Jean Cot, the Croatian military operation in January 1993 
was the UNPROFOR’s ‘Battle of Trafalgar’ in Croatia; the Serbs became fully 
armed, and thus rendered the Vance Plan unworkable.120 In this situation, UN-
PROFOR oriented its operations to what it could accomplish; for example, in 
Sector South they mediated a considerable number of ceasefires.121 Some more 
decisive actions aimed at demilitarization were taken by the Canadians and 
Argentines in Sector West, but, as during 1992, they were limited both in terms 
of time and space. For example, during September 1993, the Argentines man-
aged to take some weapons from the Serbs in the Pakrac area, but already at 
the beginning of the next month the members of the ‘Serbian Army of Krajina’ 
(SVK) once more took possession of recently abandoned positions.122 So dur-
ing 1993, all of the successes in demilitarization of the protected areas from the 
UNPROFOR’s first mandate were voided, the rebel Serbs in the UNPAs were 
armed as in early 1992, and Croatian dissatisfaction with implementation of 
this most vital aspect of the Vance Plan became even more pronounced. Even 
Nambiar’s admission that the Croatian military operation in January 1993 was 
an understandable consequence of Serbian obstruction could not conceal this 
failure.
The easing of tensions, the negotiation of a ceasefire agreement and the 
establishment of economic ties, their implementation and an attempt to find 
a permanent solution to the conflict were events which marked the political-
security situation up to the end of 1993 to the spring of 1995. As already noted, 
the UN peacekeepers had directed their efforts to the physical separation of the 
sides in the conflict, i.e., to securing a buffer zone, as foreseen under the cease-
fire agreement of March 1994. The latter was supposed to fully demilitarize the 
territory “under the exclusive control of UNPROFOR”, for in them there “will 
be no paramilitary, police nor military personnel of either side”.123 the territo-
ries of the protected areas were expanded to include the ‘pink zones’; the posi-
tion of the UNPROFOR command was that after the agreement was signed, “it 
had become irrelevant to speak of pink zones as some sort of political term”, for 
under the new circumstances, importance was accorded “solely to the buffer 
zone between the two side”.124 The available data point to the fact that despite 
119  MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/Liaison officer in Šibenik, Extraordinary report of 
1 February 1993.
120  Barbara Ekwall-Uebelhart, “Disarmament Operations in Croatia”, Disarmament and Con-
flict Resolution Project. Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Ge-
neva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996), p. 43.
121  MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/Zadar, Regular report dated 26 October 1993.
122  HMDCDR, RSK/SVK, 59th Squad Command, Strictly confidential no: 465-1, Regular com-
bat report of 1-2 October 1993.
123  “Sporazum o prekidu vatre”, Večernji list, 31 March 1993.
124  HDA, UPRH/P/F 684, SMRHUN, No. 32-08/94, Notes on the meeting with Bertrand de la 
Presle, UNPROFOR Supreme Commander, 11 August 1994.
I. MIŠKULIN, An Avoidable Failure: Peacekeeping in croatia, 1991-1995
64
the signed ceasefire agreement, nothing significant changed in the conduct 
of the rebel Serbs. In Sector East, the withdrawal of heavy arms was subject 
to prevarication, they refused to clear land-mines from the line of separation, 
and considerable forces were amassed in Darda.125 According to UN military 
monitors, in January 1995 the Croatian side fully complied with the ceasefire 
agreement, while the Serbian side entirely prohibited them from carrying out 
any patrols, which was an obvious sign of obstruction.126 The principal features 
of implementation of the ceasefire agreement in Sector North in September 
1994 were: the Serbs removed weapons from depots and hid them; their mi-
litia units constantly moved into the buffer zone; and they stubbornly refused 
to clear land-mines from the separation line.127 The situation in Sector South 
resembled a virtual state of war, with absolutely no possibility of effective su-
pervision of the buffer zone by UN peacekeepers. In the latter half of June 
1994, they seized the village of Kakma in the buffer zone.128 In July 1994, they 
attempted to militarily take the strategically vital point Debelo Brdo, but were 
repelled.129 Under such circumstances, particularly in the latter half of 1994 
and early 1995, even the little remaining Croatian willingness to cooperate had 
disappeared. When a UN civilian police team intended to conduct a scheduled 
inspection of a police station in Pakrac in January 1995, they were told that 
“the agreement is no longer valid and that the proposed inspection cannot be 
allowed”.130 The situation assumed the contours of a turning point.
The UNPROFOR and Safety in the Protected Areas
The concept of the UN protected area also implied ensuring a situation in 
which the entire civilian population in them had to be safe from armed attacks 
and other forms of intimidation or potential expulsion. The protection and 
safety of civilians in the UNPAs were among the set of tasks for all compo-
nents of the UN peacekeeping force, and particular emphasis was placed on 
the members of the United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL). They were 
supposed to oversee the work of local police units, investigate any complaints 
of discrimination and other violations of human rights and report thereon to 
125 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OUO, Report of 11 May 1994.
126 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OUO, Class.: 81/95-02/01, Ref. no.: 1076-15-95-04, 
Extraordinary report of 4 January 1995.
127 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSS/Liaison officer in Sisak, Information on violations 
of the Ceasefire Agreement of 29 March 1994, dated 28 September 1994.
128 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/Zadar, Report of the meeting of the joint commis-
sion on 30 June 1994.
129 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/Sinj, Report of 13 July 1994.
130 MUPRH, PUBB/OAP, no. 511-02-01-6/88-95, Protest letter from UNPROFOR dated 12 
January 1995.
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the peacekeeping force commander.131 However, it became apparent that in the 
period under observation the RSK authorities continued to carry out the eth-
nic cleansing which had already begun in the summer of 1991. The Croatian 
and other non-Serbian residents in the RSK territory were subject to an entire 
series of repressive measures, from murder, physical abuse, looting and de-
struction of personal property, surveillance and tracking, to expulsion. In early 
1994, the total number of Croats in RSK territory was limited to a negligible 
minority compared to the situation prior to the conflict.132 In other words, the 
persecution of the non-Serbian population in Croatia’s occupied territories, 
which began in mid-1991, continued even after the deployment of the peace-
keeping troops and their assumption of control in the protected areas.
The high number of repressive measures implemented by the RSK authori-
ties has already been analyzed in the scholarly literature, but it would none-
theless be informative to cite several examples here. Throughout the period 
under observation, Sector East was the focal point of brutal repression against 
the non-Serbian population. For example, in late May 1992, 180 Croats were 
expelled from Čakovci, Cerić and Mikluševci.133 Over the following days, the 
expulsion of Croats and other non-Serbs was carried out elsewhere, such as 
Tovarnik, for example.134 The murder of a high number of non-Serb civilians 
was also perpetrated; according to the rebel Serbs themselves, during 1992 a 
total of 150 people were killed in Sector East.135 The Krajina authorities also 
instituted mandatory labour for non-Serbs; one member of these coercively 
mobilized contingents was killed in the village of Nijemci in September 1993, 
and this contingent consisted of Croats and Slovaks from Ilok.136 At the end of 
October of that same year, the command of the Serbian forces in Baranja de-
scribed the situation there in which “a new wave is rising, marked by violence, 
private altercations, abuse, looting of private and public property, illegal occu-
pation of houses belonging to Croats leaving Baranja, and expulsion motivated 
131 Ujedinjeni narodi. Rezolucije, Vance plan, pp. 72-73.
132 For more on this, see N. Barić, Srpska pobuna, pp. 371-391.
133 M. Rupić, ed., Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat (Zagreb-Slavonski Brod: Hrvatski memo-
rijalno-dokumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, Hrvatski institut za povijest – Podružnica 
za povijest Slavonije, Srijema i Baranje, 2008),  Document no. 101, From the report on CIV-
POL oversight in the case of expulsion of 180 Croats from the villages of Čakovci, Cerić and 
Mikluševci of 19 May 1992, IV: pp. 297-298.
134 Ibid., Document no. 104, From the report on investigations by UNPROFOR CIVPOL on 
expulsion of Croats from Tovarnik of 25 May 1992, IV: pp. 301-302.
135 Mate Rupić, ed., Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-do-
kumentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2009), Document no. 11, Report of SVK Main Staff 
Security Organ to the Yugoslav Army Security Directorate of 21 January 1993, VII: pp. 22-23.
136 Mate Rupić, ed., Republika Hrvatska i Domovinski rat (Zagreb: Hrvatski memorijalno-doku-
mentacijski centar Domovinskog rata, 2009), Document no. 204, Report of 11th Corps Security 
Organ to the SVK Main Staff of 24 September 1993, IX: pp. 282-283.
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by self-interest”.137 The situation was similar elsewhere. All told, these instances 
demonstrated that the UN peacekeepers were unable to protect the non-Serb 
civilian population in the territories entrusted to them to protect.
The reasons for this failure should be sought in the interplay of several fac-
tors. As in the case of demilitarization of the protected areas, the attitude of the 
rebel Serbs was the most important cause of the failure. Throughout the entire 
existence of the RSK, they persistently implemented the policy of expulsion 
and killing of the non-Serbian population.138 The inefficacy of the UN peace-
keepers themselves was the next reason. This had its roots in an entire series of 
phenomena. Namely, the effective protection of the non-Serb population un-
der circumstances clearly marked by the orientation of the rebel Serbs toward 
a policy of ethnic exclusion plainly implied the necessity of using armed force. 
The UNPROFOR could not effectively employ force primarily due to its own 
lack of equipment and limited numbers, as well as the restrictions contained 
in its mandate. For example, in order to effectively supervise the buffer zone 
that was supposed to be established according to the ceasefire agreement of 
March 1994, the UN peacekeeping force command believed that the existing 
forces had to be augmented with 14 infantry battalions, 5 engineering bat-
talions and a helicopter unit.139 Nonetheless, as in the case of demilitarization 
of the protected areas, even those available possibilities were not utilized, or 
they were utilized in a manner that additionally increased the already growing 
Croatian dissatisfaction with the overall performance of the UN peacekeep-
ers. In September 1992, after several months of persistent attempts, Croatian 
displaced persons from Eastern Slavonia publicly announced that – regardless 
of opposition by the UNPROFOR – they would begin their organized return. 
A procession of displaced persons arrived at the UNPROFOR checkpoint in 
Tenjski Antunovac on 30 September 1992, but they were halted by the mem-
bers of RUSBAT.140 In order to halt similar activities by displaced persons, in 
October 1992 the UNPROFOR was authorized to use force.141 there are no 
indications that similar authorization was granted in order to halt the expul-
sion of non-Serbs from that very same sector. The ineffective demilitarization 
of the protected areas gave the rebel Serbs effective military control over them, 
thus placing the remaining non-Serb population to a state of complete subju-
gation. The failure of demilitarization of the protected areas therefore created 
the context in which the rebel Serbs could continue to implement their policy 
137 Ibid., book 9, Document no. 269, Report of the Baranja Division Command on the security 
situation in the territory of Baranja, dated 28 October 1993, p. 385.
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of ethnic cleansing unimpeded. The fact that the highest command structures 
of the UN peacekeeping force deemed the protection of the Serbian minority 
in Croatia their primary task has already been pointed out. In this sense, the 
lack of effective protection of the non-Serb population in the protected areas 
may also be ascribed to this fact. In late July 1993, in response to a comment by 
the Croatian liaison officer that the expulsion of the remaining non-Serbs was 
continuing, the UN civilian affairs chief in Sector East, Francise Blondine Neg-
ga, stated that according to the Vance Plan the UN peacekeepers had “come to 
protect the ‘Serbian minority’ and that they had come upon a Serbian major-
ity and a Croatian minority”.142 Negga’s statement thus reflected a substantial 
shortcoming of the Vance Plan. This failure led to the shifting of blame be-
tween individual components of the UN peacekeeping force. Representatives 
of the military and civilian components of the peace mission often pointed out 
that protection of civilians was the job of UNCIVPOL, while the latter’s com-
manders told Croatian liaison officers that they had nowhere near the neces-
sary manpower.143 UN peacekeepers themselves were often – and especially 
after January 1993 – the target of armed attacks and looting raids conducted 
by various Serbian armed groups.144 Northing more could probably have been 
expected from a protection force that was unable to effectively protect even its 
own members.
Responding to the constant insistence by the authorities in Zagreb tied 
to the remaining Croatian population in the village of Kijevo, the director of 
UNPROFOR Civilian Affairs, Irishman Cedric Thornberry, stated in early 
September 1992 that his subordinates had visited the village and delivered food 
aid, that UNCIVPOL had set up a system of patrolling, and that representatives 
of the Serbian militia had promised to conduct an investigation upon the 
intervention of the local civilian affairs chief, while he said that he had sought 
an urgent meeting with Milan Martić.145 The content of Thornberry’s response 
was universal in nature, i.e., it roughly set down the boundaries of what the 
UN peacekeeping force was prepared to do, and what they generally did, with 
reference to protection of civilian populations in the protected areas. But this 
was not nearly enough, and that such actions did not succeed in compelling 
the rebel Serbs to cease their repression. Events in Podlapača, in the territory 
of the former municipality of Korenica, served to illustrate the full complexity 
of the UNPROFOR’s activities in the protection of non-Serbian populations. 
After the cessation of warfare in early 1992, a portion of the pre-war Croatian 
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population continued to live in this village, about 160 in all, of whom over 
half were over 50 years of age.146 However, they were subject to unrelenting 
repression, mostly in the form of looting.147 In mid-June 1992, as stated, “a 
group of extremists [came to the village from Korenica] and with threats and 
brandishing weapons they began to expel the people of Croatian nationality”.148 
The expulsion was prevented by the joint intervention of the Serbian 
authorities and the Czech UNPROFOR troops.149 The situation nevertheless 
worsened, so via UNPROFOR the residents sought supplies of food and fuel 
from the Croatian government.150 The good will of the RSK authorities soon 
disappeared, an economic blockade of the local residents was set up, and the 
Czechs remained the sole hope of the local Croats: they organized a checkpoint 
in the village and, due to Serb rejections, they assumed responsibility for 
supplying the residents with living necessities. UNCIVPOL also undertook 
certain activities, such as establishing mobile patrols. The Podlapača Croats 
appreciated the efforts of the Czechs and UNCIVPOL to protect them, and 
noted that it was solely thanks to these efforts that they remained in the village. 
Even so, at night the situation changed, and since, as they acknowledged 
themselves, the Czech were subject to threats, they left the village at nightfall.151 
This left the remaining residents at the mercy of the RSK authorities and their 
paramilitary groups. According to available data, in mid-1993 there were 114 
people left in Podlapača, and they were being defended by 98 members of the 
Czech battalion.152 In September of that same year, after the Croatian operations 
in the Medak Pocket, the situation for the Podlapača Croats worsened. Several 
civilians were killed.153 The Serbian authorities also instituted mandatory labour 
for these Croatian civilians.154 The Serbian authorities in Korenica believed 
that they had to leave, and they faulted UN representatives for their allegedly 
exaggerated and unnecessary concern for their safety.155 In the second half of 
1993, even Thornberry visited Podlapača after Zagreb intervened. The reason 
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was the drastically deteriorating safety in the village. According to residents, 
the pressure from the rebel Serbs was unsustainable: “Nobody in the village 
had even one rifle, and everything has been set afire, and taken away. They 
beat young people, they even beat old ladies”.156 According to the statements 
from Thornberry’s letter, sent to the chairman of the Croatian commission in 
charge of relations with UNPROFOR, the people of Podlapača told him that 
“they no longer feel able to live in the village and they want to cross over the 
line of hostilities in the territory of Croatia under the control of the Croatian 
authorities [sic!]”.157 Thornberry when to Korenica immediately thereafter, but 
the local Serbs resolutely told him that “it was unrealistic to expect them to 
adhere to pledges of security”.158 He also intervened with Knin by writing a 
letter.159 It is therefore obvious that the lives of the Podlapača Croats were in 
peril and that the UNPROFOR was no longer able to protect them, and the 
situation continued to deteriorate. For example, in December 1993, members 
of the rebel Serb militia simply seized sixty packages of humanitarian aid being 
carried by the Czechs for the Croats in Podlapača.160 As a logical consequence 
of this type of life in constant danger, it came as no surprise that the local Croats 
expressed the desire to leave Podlapača. The first proposal was forwarded via 
UNPROFOR to the Croatian authorities in September 1993.161 In the latter half 
of January 1994, a total of 28 Croats from Podlapača set off from Podlapača in 
UNPROFOR vehicles, headed for Croatia’s free territory, but they stopped at 
the crossing point, because suddenly they changed their minds and “began 
asking to return”.162 According to the same source, the UNPROFOR wanted 
to bring over another 45 Croats even earlier, which the Croatian authorities 
prevented.163 In the second half of August 1995, Croatian forces came upon 
a total of 98 people there.164 Several facts are irrefutable. It is certain that the 
Podlapača Croats would have been expelled in early 1992, and more serious 
crimes did not occur thanks to the presence of the UN peacekeepers. The locals 
praised the work of the UN peacekeepers: “The UNPROFOR saved us”.165 Even 
so, the end result was precisely what the rebel Serbs wanted: the expulsion 
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of the Croatian population from Podlapača during the observed period was 
constant. Similarly, the safety of those who had remained was very precarious. 
In this sense, despite the efforts of the Czechs, over the long term the activities 
of the UN peacekeepers may be assessed as unsuccessful. There are some 
indications that the UNPROFOR troops themselves attempted to convince 
these residents to leave, and it is entirely certain that the fatalism expressed 
in Thornberry’s statements to them as early as September 1993 did not help: 
“No one can guarantee complete safety, even if you had one UN soldier and 
one police officer for each individual. Not even God himself could keep you 
completely safe if he were standing next to each one of you”.166
The expulsion of the Croatian population from Podlapača serves as a lucid 
illustration of one of the most important features of the humanitarian situation 
in the areas under the protection of UN peacekeepers during the 1992-1995 
period, and that was the continuation of ethnic cleansing in the territory under 
the control of the rebel Serbs. Instead of facilitating the return of the popula-
tion, the UNPROFOR’s functioning in the protected areas actually contributed 
to the overall atmosphere in which the expulsion of the non-Serb population 
became constant. But the creation of conditions for the return of displaced 
persons was one of the fundamental tasks which the UN peacekeeping force 
assumed under the Vance Plan. In this, they had to cooperate with numerous 
other humanitarian organizations, while implementation of displaced person 
returns was entrusted to the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR).167 However, it was apparent that nothing would come of returning 
displaced persons to their homes inasmuch as the UNPROFOR did not man-
age to stabilize the situation in the protected areas. A condition for stabiliza-
tion was certainly the consent of the rebel Serbs to the return of the displaced 
populations. This consent was entirely lacking, and the Krajina authorities had 
already begun implementing various measures in early 1992 aimed at prevent-
ing such returns.168 The rebel Serbs made sure their stance was conveyed to the 
Croatian authorities. For example, via UNPROFOR, Croatian liaison officers 
in the Zadar area were told in no uncertain terms that any possibility of “the 
return of the Croatian populace to the area ever” was rejected.169 A certain dif-
fidence within the ranks of the UN peace mission with reference to the return 
of displaced persons could be felt immediately. First, at the very beginning 
it was apparent that the assumption of any firm commitments was avoided. 
Thornberry said in late March 1992 that “numerous members of UNPROFOR, 
among them approximately 500 police officers, will do their best to make sure 
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that displaced persons return to their homes and live there in peace”.170 the 
failure to demilitarize the protected areas, which was evident by the latter half 
of 1992, practically predetermined further developments. From that point for-
ward, the accepted stance in statements made by all UN peace mission officials 
in Croatia was that the return of displaced persons could not be implemented 
because the security conditions for this had not been created. Nothing signifi-
cant would change up to the very end of the UNPROFOR mandate in Croatia.
Certain activities aimed at creating conditions in the protected areas that 
could be conducive to the return of displaced persons were nonetheless un-
dertaken. The UN peace mission’s civilian affairs department organized an 
entire series of projects, such as one-day visits by displaced persons to their 
places of original residence and meetings of separated families at UNPROFOR 
checkpoints. All of these proved rather successful, but exclusively in UNPA 
West during the latter half of 1992. This success had to do with the somewhat 
more accommodating stance of the local Serbian civilian and military authori-
ties, the exceptional persistence and dexterity of that sector’s civilian affairs 
chief and the specific geographic aspects of UNPA West.171 Elsewhere such 
attempts failed already by mid-1992. In November 1992, the Croatian and Ser-
bian sides in the Unešić areas managed to arrange the reciprocal visit by the 
local displaced Croatian population to local cemeteries. The visit proceeded 
without incident. Pointedly, this arrangement was made without notification 
being sent to the local UNPROFOR detachment.172 But these were exceptional 
cases which, despite the efforts of the Croatian authorities, did not become 
ongoing. The failure to create the conditions for the return of displaced per-
sons obviously constituted a great burden for the UNPROFOR troops. There 
were indications that the military component of the UN peace mission felt 
that it should have been more actively involved. The commander of the French 
battalion, Colonel Robert Mille, was embittered by the actions of the civilian 
affairs chief in Sector South, Russian Viktor Andreev, who continually stressed 
“that it’s still not time [for the return of displaced persons]”; he therefore de-
cided on his own to create the conditions “for the return of displaced persons 
to Sveti Rok, Ričice and Novigrad”.173 Mille’s assertions were nevertheless sim-
ply good intentions; the decision to used armed force was beyond the scope of 
his decision-making authority.
Instead of this, there were recorded cases in which the UNPROFOR ob-
viously did not conduct itself with the greatest tact, or, at the very least, not 
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quite in compliance with the mission’s mandate. During the spring of 1992, 
according to Croatian sources, over 20,000 thousand Serbs were resettled in 
Sector East, mainly from western Slavonia. However, this figure continually 
increased, while at the same time the non-Serbian population from this area 
was expelled.174 The UNPROFOR did not undertake any significant effort to 
oppose the obvious tendency of the local rebel Serbs to create an ethnically 
homogenous territory. Even worse, in response to the justified protests of the 
Croatian authorities, which threatened specific actions to prevent such ten-
dencies, the UNPROFOR stated that only it had the authority over movements 
of civilian populations, which was obviously a euphemism used to conceal the 
tacit consent to the settlement of Serbs.175 The loss of the UNPROFOR’s neu-
trality is illustrated by the following example. Thanks to the improved security 
situation and the undoubtedly improved economic status, by the end of June 
1993 almost 2,000 Serbian displaced persons and refugees returned to Sector 
West.176 At the same time, not a single Croatian displaced person returned to 
the area of that same sector under Serbian control. Warned of this situation in 
September 1992, Sector Commander Zabala from Argentina passed the blame 
to the UNHCR, stating that his basic task was only to “create the security con-
ditions for the return of displaced persons”.177 It is clear that such actions only 
increased the already present, and justified, Croatian dissatisfaction. Zagreb 
attempted to turn this to its advantage, which came to the fore in the summer 
of 1994 when displaced persons blockaded the UNPROFOR.178
From the very beginning, the return of displaced persons in the territory 
of the UN protected areas was actually an attempt to square a circle. The 
obstruction of the rebel Serbs and the ambiguity of the UN peacekeeping 
mandate were only one side of the coin. The other consisted of the fact that 
these returns could not be carried forward without a change in the political 
context, i.e., without a political solution to the overall conflict in Croatia, 
and that was not the UNPROFOR’s assignment. In other words, without the 
establishment of Croatian authority over the UN protected areas, returns were 
essentially a case of “mission impossible”. The essence of the entire problem 
in Croatia was largely summed up in a statement by the Croatian defence 
minister at the time, Gojko Šušak. Speaking on this matter at a session of the 
Croatian Government in the summer of 1994, he pointed out “the enormous 
discrepancies between the desires of displaced persons, the UNPROFOR’s 
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capability and the aspirations of the international community to fulfil its 
assumed commitments”.179 It was obvious that the conditions for the return of 
displaced persons could only be created at higher decision-making levels. In 
this context, the already demonstrated fact that the UNPROFOR was “too slow 
and insufficiently effective” only additionally complicated matters.180
The UNCRO in Croatia
In the first half of January 1995, Croatia’s state leadership sent a letter to UN 
Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in which it informed him that the 
Republic of Croatia intended to terminate the peacekeeping force’s mandate. 
The decision was supposed to become effective on 30 March 1995, when 
yet another of the UNPROFOR’s mandates was set to expire. The Croatian 
decision was rooted in the many years of dissatisfaction with the functioning 
of the UN peacekeeping force, which was incapable of making any notable 
progress in implementing the most important provisions of the peacekeeping 
operation. Moreover, Boutros-Ghali was told that the Croatian leadership 
considered “the continuation of the UNPROFOR’s presence in the occupied 
territories counterproductive to the peace process”.181 the international 
community’s response to what was at that point the most vocal expression of 
Croatian dissatisfaction was to establish a new peacekeeping operation, under 
the designation UNCRO. The change in the official designation of the UN’s 
peacekeeping operation in Croatia was actually the full extent of the change 
in comparison to the period when the peacekeepers bore the designation 
UNPROFOR. The rebel Serbs expressed aversion and dissatisfaction over 
the new UN peacekeeping operation, and particularly its official designation. 
For example, UNCRO troops were clearly told that their deployment on the 
borders between Croatia and Serbia was entirely unacceptable.182 There was no 
longer a chance of any attempts at demilitarization of the of the areas under the 
protection of the UN peacekeeping forces. After the Croatian operation which 
liberated western Slavonia, the situation in Sector South clearly demonstrated 
the failure of the peacekeeping forces: the rebel Serbs carried out a full military 
draft, activated their heavy artillery, deployed their forces to take up positions 
in the buffer zone, and military assistance was sent in from Serbia. The local 
UNCRO commander confirmed all of this information was confirmed for the 
Croatian authorities.183 The situation was no better in Sector East: Serbian forces 
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openly assumed combat positions.184 On the day on which Croatian military 
operations were launched in Sectors North and South, 5 August 1995, Serb 
forces carried out artillery and infantry attacks on Croatian positions in the 
village of Cerić. The Russian UNCRO battalion observed the entire campaign, 
and did not respond even when Serbian forces took over their checkpoint.185 
Clearly, the response of UNCRO forces during the Croatian military operation 
in May and August of 1995 may be interpreted in the same context; notified in 
due time on the commencement of these operations, UNCRO forces left their 
checkpoints and withdrew to their bases. There are some indicators which 
point to the conclusion that the UNCRO troops themselves did not consider 
the UN peacekeeping operation in Croatia a serious attempt at peacekeeping. 
At a meeting with the Croatian military authorities in Sector South in late 
April 1995, a Canadian officer, Desmond Morton, proposed that they hold a 
joint meeting which he believed “would yield results in the stabilization of 
the situation”.186 How much he believed in the success of his own attempt was 
reflected in his statement that “it is not entirely certain that we will manage 
to get the Serbs to the table, but they did very patiently listen”; his statement 
that he was not at all “an optimist in the new UN mission/mandate” certainly 
could hot have had a positive impact.187 The conduct of the Czech battalion 
may also serve as an example which revealed the actual nature of the new 
UN peacekeeping operation. Their vehicles had registration plates which 
had written on them both UNCRO and UNPROFOR; the first were used in 
free Croatian territory, while the second were used in territory controlled by 
the Serbs. This was motivated by fear. According to the Czechs themselves, 
the rebel Serbs scrawled graffiti on their buildings, “messages such as, e.g., 
‘TRAITORS’, and when they attempted to use the designation UNCRO, the 
Serbian response was “akin to lunacy”.188 Upon the establishment of UNCRO, 
one Croatian diplomat claimed that with this Croatia had closed the file on 
UNPROFOR.189 The establishment of a new UN peacekeeping operation in 
Croatia did not in fact bring anything new.
In Lieu of a Conclusion – An Attempt at an Assessment
Despite all of the arguments made above, assessing the peacekeeping op-
eration in Croatia from 1992 to 1995 is no simple task. This is largely because 
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the concept of success in peacekeeping operations has still not been precisely 
defined.190 A potentially simpler method is to assess the effectiveness of their 
mandates. In this sense, the mandates of UNPROFOR and UNCRO in Croatia 
may be deemed failures. The peacekeeping forces did little with reference to 
the two most vital aspects of the Vance Plan: demilitarization and establish-
ment of sound security situations in the areas under UN protection. In the en-
tire period under observation, the rebel Serbs obviously had at their disposal 
a high quantity of diverse arms, which they did not even bother to conceal. 
By the same token, this entire period was characterized by the persistence of 
repressive procedures aimed at the non-Serbian population in those territo-
ries. Certain positive results which the peacekeeping force managed to secure 
with regard to the two aforementioned aspects of the Vance Plan were usually 
rendered superfluous rather quickly, with the situation becoming even more 
grave. In this sense, the peacekeeping forces could be blamed for excessively 
rigid functioning within the framework of their mandate and failure to take 
advantage of the options available to them, particularly with reference to the 
use of force. Exceeding the necessary framework of neutrality, the obvious 
appearance of pro-Serbian clientelism and other numerous foibles also con-
tributed to the ineffective implementation of their mandated tasks. Croatian 
dissatisfaction with their impact grew constantly, and came to a head in 1995. 
Paradoxically, the obvious failure during the course of the UN peacekeeping 
mandate in Croatia ended in the desired fashion at the expiry of the mandate, 
i.e., without a violent rupture. Reduced to only one of the protected areas es-
tablished in 1992, in eastern Slavonia, the peacekeeping operation under the 
designation UNCRO folded peacefully in November 1995. This was not the 
only obvious paradox. It is easy to agree with the conclusion that – given the 
humanitarian aspect of the crisis – the situation would have been even worse 
without the peacekeepers. For there can be no doubt that the presence of UN 
peacekeepers nonetheless limited the violence of the conflict, and prevented 
its spread throughout Croatia, reduced human suffering and, despite obvious 
obstacles, managed to promote some ideas that were supposed to help regulate 
and resolve the conflict. There is no need to place special emphasis on the fact 
that these are all features of successful peacekeeping.
Assessing the performance of the UNPROFOR in Croatia in March 1995, 
US diplomat Herbert Okun said that the fundamental tasks of the Vance Plan 
were to insure the status quo, place the rebel Serbs’ heavy weapons under effec-
tive control, demilitarize the protected areas, monitor the local police (primar-
ily where this pertained to human rights) and help displaced persons return to 
their homes. Okun concluded that the UN peacekeeping forces succeeded in 
the first aim, but only initially in the second, while they failed to carry out the 
remaining three tasks. Additionally, he noted that the Vance Plan originally 
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foresaw the deployment of peacekeeping troops uniformly throughout the 
protected areas, and that this was altered by a UN Security Council decision, 
so that the majority of the forces were posted at the form battle lines.191 Quite 
predictably, the rebel Serbs saw this as the reinforcement of their borders, and 
they decided to fully obstruct the Vance Plan; equally predictably, understand-
able Croatian dissatisfaction ensued. Okun’s arguments therefore point to the 
UN Security Council’s policies as the factor which had a crucial impact on the 
course of peacekeeping operations in Croatia. Available information leads to 
the conclusion that the members of the UN peacekeeping forces themselves 
were aware of the difficulties of their position, which the chief of the Civil-
ian Affairs Department in Sector North, Kenyan Charles Kirudja, described as 
“sit and watch”.192 The complete rigidity of mandated authority was more than 
apparent. The members of the Czech battalion thus told the Croats that their 
“hands were tied and they are not able to perform their tasks”.193 The only body 
which had the authority to alter the UN peacekeeping mandate was the UN 
Security Council – the body which also set down the original mandate. There 
is nothing to indicate that this body would have even seriously considered 
changing the nature of the peacekeeping operation in Croatia (from peace-
keeping to peace enforcement), even though, for example, Serbian obstruction 
of the Vance Plan was obvious already in 1992. The list of obvious miscarriages 
by the Security Council does not end here. Namely, it was precisely this body 
which should bear most of the blame for the complete loss of legitimacy of 
the peacekeeping forces, which was apparent already at the beginning of mid-
1992. It was the Security Council which allowed the deployment of peace-
keepers at the former battle lines, rather than in the entire protected areas. 
Ultimately, the Security Council’s policies may also be deemed the primary 
motive behind the Croatian decision to initiate its military operations in 1995. 
The reasons for the Security Council’s conduct in this regard should be sought 
in the features of the political and diplomatic actions of the international com-
munity vis-à-vis the Yugoslav crisis and the wars in the states which emerged 
after its collapse that had already been observed long before: the conflicting 
interests of the most important states, the lack of a unified policy, the assump-
tion of pro-clientelist positions and a failure to keep pace with events. In this 
sense, the UN Security Council’s operational mechanism – the UN peacekeep-
ing troops – could not generate any other kind of result. Just as the body which 
formed them was characterized by numerous failings, so too did they neces-
sarily reflect these failings. So far greater responsibility for the failure of the 
peacekeeping operation in Croatia is borne by the UN structures in New York 
than by the peacekeeping force command in Zagreb. 
191 Herbert Okun, “What Vance Accomplished in Croatia”, New York Times, 25 March 1995.
192 MVPEIRH, VRH/UUNPFPMEZ, MORH/GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSS, Notes from the 
meeting held on 30 July 1993.
193 MORH, SVA, GSHV/UUNPFPMEZ/OSJ/ČZV Lika, Regular report dated 3 March 1993.
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Vermeidbare Misserfolge: Friedenssicherungsmissionen in 
Kroatien 1991-1995 
Zusammenfassung
In diesem Artikel analysiert der Autor die Ursachen der Einrichtung von 
zwei Friedenssicherungsoperationen in Kroatien am Anfang und zu Mitte der 
1990-er Jahre sowie das Implementieren von zwei ihren wichtigsten Kompo-
nenten und ihre Folgen. Der Autor stellte fest, dass es klassische Friedenssi-
cherungsoperationen waren, basiert auf den von Diplomaten Cyrus Vance und 
Marrack Goulding im Namen der Vereinten Nationen vorgeschlagenen Do-
kumenten. Beide Operationen wurden schließlich als unerfolgreich geschätzt, 
meistens weil sie die unwirksame und unkoordinierte Politik der internation-
alen Staatengemeinschaft gegenüber Jugoslawien und den nach seiner gewalt-
samen Desintegration entstandenen Staaten reflektierten. 
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